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INTRODUCTION
Justice Brennan could not have been more wrong. In a famous 1977
article for the Harvard Law Review, Justice William J. Brennan exhorted
state courts to pick up some of the protection of individual liberties that the
United States Supreme Court had vigorously employed during the 1960s,
but had lately retreated from in the 1970s.1 In his “call to arms” Justice
Brennan emphasized a fundamental cornerstone of state constitutional law:
that states may interpret their own constitutions to afford greater protection
of individual liberties than the United States Constitution, even when the
constitutional provisions in question are worded identically.2 Justice
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1
See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions & the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489, 495 (1977); see also G. Alan Tarr, The New Judicial Federalism in
Perspective, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1097, 1112 (1997) (stating that Justice Brennan’s
“disagreement with the conservative majority on the U.S. Supreme Court gave him reason
to encourage the development of state constitutional law”). Justice Brennan was inviting
state courts to protect individual liberties when the federal courts would not, but he also
gave credit to the work that state courts were already pursuing in this task. See Brennan,
supra, at 495 (“[M]ore and more state courts are construing state constitutional
counterparts of provisions of the Bill of Rights as guaranteeing citizens of their states even
more protection than the federal provisions, even those identically phrased.”).
2
See Brennan, supra note 1, at 491. State courts repeatedly emphasize their independent
ability afford greater protection under their own constitutions than is federally required.
See, e.g., People v. Dunn, 564 N.E.2d 1054, 1057 (N.Y. 1990) (“[T]his Court has not
hesitated to interpret article I, § 12 independently of its Federal counterpart when the
analysis by the Supreme Court in a given area has threatened to undercut the right of our
citizens to be free from unreasonable government intrusions.”).
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Brennan focused on three areas in his article: equal protection,3 procedural
due process protections of governmental benefits4 (often labeled the “new
property”5), and the “specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights,”6 especially
criminal procedure.7 In these areas state courts were “now beginning to
emphasize the protections of their states’ own bills of rights.”8 He saw the
development as something of recent vintage that needed to grow. Other
writings of the time entitled this development the “New Judicial
Federalism.”9
Justice Brennan’s exhortation was a needed recognition of the
importance of state constitutions in our system of federalism, and a timely
reminder to the legal community not to forget our dual system of
constitutionalism.10 That being said, for some inexplicable reason Justice
Brennan completely omitted a field of state constitutional law where states
had been actively pursuing this “New Judicial Federalism” for years. The
omission is truly staggering. The field he neglected to add to the three
mentioned above is the protection of economic liberties. These liberties
include the right to contract and the right to make a living, especially as
protected through the doctrine of “economic substantive due process.”11
Justice Brennan even went so far as to suggest that this field did not exist,
asserting “courts do not today substitute their personal economic beliefs for

3

See id. (discussing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186 (1962), among other cases).
4
See id. 491-92 (“The root requirement of due process is that, except for some
extraordinary situations, as individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is
deprived of any significant ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interest.”).
5
See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970) (citing Charles A. Reich, The New
Property, 73 Yale L. J. 733 (1964)).
6
See Brennan, supra note 1, at 492.
7
See id. (noting that the incorporation of many aspects of the Bill of Rights against the
states has been particularly strong in “the administration of the criminal justice system”).
8
Id. at 495.
9
See, e.g., Louise Weinberg, The New Judicial Federalism, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1191 (1977).
10
In fact, Justice Brennan called himself “a devout believer” in “our concept of
federalism.” Brennan, supra note 1, at 502. Justice Brennan was emphatically correct in
diagnosing the lack of concern placed upon state constitutional law. Law school
curriculums of the time reflected the paucity of interest in state constitutional law: “Law
schools . . . must share the blame for the failure by counsel and the courts to do justice to
state constitutions. The typical course in constitutional law now virtually ignores the
existence of state constitutions.” James C. Kirby, Jr., Expansive Judicial Review of
Economic Regulation Under State Constitutions: The Case for Realism, 48 TENN. L. REV.
241, 243, 246 (1981). Whether instruction is now better after thirty years of the “New
Judicial Federalism” is beyond the scope of this article.
11
See infra Part I.A.
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the judgments of our democratically elected legislatures.”12 By “do not
today” he was referencing the practices of the Supreme Court during the
“Lochner era” where the Court utilized the Constitution’s due process
clauses to strike down economic regulations and protect economic
liberties.13
This last assertion ignored forty years of state courts wielding the
doctrine of economic substantive due process in the face of the Supreme
Court’s renunciation of the Lochner era.14 It is even more perplexing that
Justice Brennan did not discuss this history given that its existence was no
mystery by 1977.15 As will be discussed in detail throughout this Article,
12

Brennan, supra note 1, at 490-91 (citing Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963).
It might be suggested that Justice Brennan was referring to federal courts with this
statement, but then why the complete lack of any reference to recent state court protection
of economic liberties?
13
See infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
14
See infra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
15
Many scholarly articles have documented the preservation of economic substantive due
process in the state courts. For those before 1977 see, for example, A.E. Dick Howard,
State Courts & Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873,
883 (1976) (“[N]otwithstanding the Supreme Court’s post-1937 ‘hands-off’ posture in the
economic sphere, studies of state court decisions have made it clear that substantive due
process has lived on in the states.”); Note, Counterrevolution in State Constitutional Law,
15 STAN. L. REV. 309, 321 (1963) (“The increasing frequency of such decisions indicates
that economic due process is neither dead nor dying and that it is the United States
Supreme Court, rather than the state courts, which is resisting the current drift in
constitutional interpretation.”); John A.C. Hetherington, State Economic Regulation &
Substantive Due Process of Law, 53 NW. U. L. R. 226, 226-27 (1958) (“Since the
abandonment by the Supreme Court of substantive due process as a test of the validity of
state economic regulation, there have been many conflicting decisions in the substantive
due process field in the state courts.”); John A. Hoskins & David A. Katz, Substantive Due
Process in the States Revisited, 18 OHIO ST. L.J. 384, 386 (1957) (“These state courts
continue to insist, as did the pre-1934 federal judiciary, that legislative enactment of state
public policy be tempered by what the state courts believe to be desirable, effective and
proper.”); Monrad G. Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive Due Process in the States, 34
MINN. L, REV. 91, 92 (1950) (“[S]ome state supreme courts when interpreting the due
process clause or its equivalent in their state constitutions have continued to interfere freely
with legislative policies.”).
The fact that these numerous studies exist has not prevented more recent studies
from ignoring post-New Deal economic substantive due process under state constitutional
law. See, e.g., Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: State Constitutions in the
Federal Courts, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1409, 1412 n.5 (1998). Shapiro cites G. ALAN TARR,
UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 165-66 (1998), for the proposition that from
1950-1969 “state courts relied on state constitutions to afford greater protection than was
available under the [United States] constitution only 10 times.” Id. As this Article
illustrates, that proposition is completely false. It may stem from an understanding of
rights that only encompasses those embraced by Justice Brennan, see supra notes 3-8 and
accompanying text, and rejects economic liberties. If that is so, it would be helpful for
such studies to point that understanding out.
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from 1937 through to the present day, almost every state court of highest
review has interpreted its own constitution’s due process clause, and similar
provisions, to strike down economic regulations. These state courts have
done so even when explicitly acknowledging that the United States
Supreme Court has interpreted the equivalent language in the United States
Constitution to not extend such protection of economic liberties.16 This
protection includes the invalidation of economic regulations in many
different areas of economic affairs, such as occupational licensing,
advertising, and price controls.17
Past studies of this phenomenon have covered all of these areas and
have given a great deal of in-depth analysis of specific state court decisions
that this Article cannot match.18 What all past studies have lacked,
however, is a systematic attempt to catalog every economic substantive due
process opinion under state constitutional law since the close of the Lochner
era. This Article does just that. It presents every instance of a state court of
highest review protecting economic liberties through the use of the doctrine
of economic substantive due process, as that term is defined in Part I, under
state constitution law since 1940.19
The absence of a full-fledged “compendium” of economic
substantive due process cases under state constitutional law has frustrated
attempts to more deeply inquire into how frequently states courts have
protected economic liberty via economic substantive due process, and what
the trends in that frequency have been. Admitted one scholar in 1981, “[n]o
single study has purported to collect all the state cases in this area . . . .”20
16

See especially infra Appendix A (listing all cases uncovered by this study where state
courts have used economic substantive due process to protect economic liberties, with the
exception of land use zoning cases); see also infra notes 172-184 and accompanying text
(providing examples of state courts protecting economic liberties even when they
acknowledge other courts would not).
17
See infra Part I.B.2.
18
See, e.g., Joshua A. Newberg, In Defense of Aston Park: The Case For State Substantive
Due Process Review of Health Care Regulation, 68 N.C. L. REV. 253, 257-59 (1990);
Gabriella S. Tussusov, A Modern Look at Substantive Due Process: Judicial Review of
State Economic Regulation Under the New York and Federal Constitutions, 33 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 529, 567 (1988).
19
Appendix A presents the complete enumeration of the relevant cases. The inclusion of
only state courts of highest review, which are generically referred to below as “state
supreme courts,” instead of all state courts, is made for reasons of research convenience.
LEXIS and WESTLAW searches of fifty courts covering sixty-five years of case law is
long enough for one researcher. The Author invites other scholars, but this time with an
army of research assistants, to complete the job in the state lower courts. He suspects,
however, that the trends (although, obviously, not the number of cases) would not differ
significantly.
20
Kirby, supra note 10, at 252; see also Tussusov, supra note 18, at 530 n.7 (“While no
single study has attempted to collect all the state decisions illustrating state judicial
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Another, admitting she lacked the benefit of an overall analysis data set,
stated that “an overwhelming majority of states appear to have viable
precedents for judicial invalidation of economic measures on due process
grounds.”21 Not only this, but because she lacked a comprehensive set of
cases in the area, it was reasonable of her to conclude, in 1988, that there
was a “growing national trend on the state level toward active review” of
economic regulation.22 This study’s data illustrate that by 1988 the actual
trend was moving in the opposite direction.
Pursuant to its data, this Article presents the discovery that in the
1970s, and especially the 1980s, state court enforcement of economic
substantive due process began to wane. This discovery leads one to believe
that, in spite of his omissions, perhaps Justice Brennan was on to something
when he omitted an area of state constitutional law otherwise worthy of the
“New Judicial Federalism.” This does not mean that by 1977 economic
substantive due process under state constitutional law was dead, just that it
was about to enter a much leaner stage than before.23
This Article begins in Part I with the methodology used in
determining when a case falls under the definition of “economic substantive
due process” used here. Part II opens with a brief history of the doctrine of
economic substantive due process and of how it found favor in the Lochner
era of the early Twentieth Century. It then moves on to an overview of
state court applications of economic substantive due process since 1940 and
of the different contexts in which it has arisen. Part III presents the stateby-state findings of the study, summarizing the data included in the
Appendixes and highlighting a few states that are particularly revealing of
the trends in economic substantive due process at the state level over the
last sixty-five years.24 Finally, in Part IV the Article addresses the question
activism in the economic area, an overwhelming majority of states appear to have viable
precedents for judicial invalidation of economic measures on due process grounds.”).
21
Tussusov, supra note 18, at 530 n.7 (emphasis added).
22
Tussusov, supra note 18, at 567. The Author himself was also taken in by the seductive
allure of isolated state cases not set against a comprehensive study of trends in the law. See
Anthony B. Sanders, Comment: Exhumation Through Burial: How Casket Regulations
Unearthed Economic Substantive Due Process in Craigmiles v. Giles 88 Minn. L Rev. 668,
678 (2004) (stating that federal and state courts have recently enforced the doctrine of
economic substantive due process to a greater degree). The trend in lower federal courts,
however, does appear (but, yes, only “appear”) to be on the upswing, despite the Supreme
Court’s refusal to revive it. See id. at 678-80 (listing recent federal cases striking down
economic regulations under a substantive reading of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause).
23
See infra notes 135-146 and accompanying text.
24
For those interested in examining the Article’s actual data, Appendix A enumerates,
alphabetically by state, every economic substantive due process case since 1940, and
Appendix B numerically summarizes these cases by decade and state.
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of why the rate at which state courts used economic substantive due process
dropped so precipitously in the 1970s and 1980s. What the Article suggests
is that in the wake of the non-economic substantive due process case Roe v.
Wade,25 and similar “right to privacy” cases, former defenders of the
doctrine recognized its similarity with that underlying Roe. These former
defenders of economic substantive due process, and otherwise supporters of
the free market, chose to then shy away from the doctrine instead of
pursuing the more problematic task of distinguishing it from its noneconomic cousin.
I.

DEFINING ECONOMIC SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS: WHAT IS
INCLUDED IN THIS STUDY AND WHAT IS NOT

Before diving into the findings of this study, or presenting its
historical background, this Part briefly outlines the study’s methodology.
The following explains what qualifies a case to be included in the study.
This is more complicated than it may at first appear, and is highly
contingent on the right that a court protects, and the constitutional basis the
court uses in protecting that right.26
A.

What is Under the “Economic Substantive Due Process” Umbrella

This study is a comprehensive review of when state courts of highest
review have struck down economic regulations through the doctrine of
economic substantive due process under state constitutional law since 1940.
Simply put, the study has included cases that fall under the rubric of
Lochner era jurisprudence. The cases that qualify for this understanding are

25

410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
A note should also be made on how the cases composing this study were discovered.
That has been accomplished through scouring past articles on the subject, reading cases
cited by, and those that have cited, opinions known to be economic substantive due process
opinions, and through LEXIS and WESTLAW searches. The searches have been of the
form “‘police power’ w/20 unconstitutional’” and “‘due process’ w/20 unconstitutional.’”
In addition, for states that lack an explicit “due process” clause, a search including the state
constitution’s particular language was added. The study does not pretend to have found
every relevant case since 1940. Doubtless there are cases that the Author has simply
missed, that searches were not open-ended enough to find, or that the Author incorrectly
judged to not fall within the definition of “economic substantive due process” used here.
As a glance of Appendix B makes clear, the omission of a couple cases in a single state
could indeed change the results of this study as regards that state, especially as regards
decade-by- decade data. However, as regards national trends over each decade, more than a
few omissions would be needed to alter the conclusions.

26

6

THE “NEW JUDICIAL FEDERALISM” BEFORE ITS
TIME

7

instances of state courts protecting Lockean rights of an economic nature.27
Whatever the merits of “natural rights theory,” it is these rights, i.e. the right
to contract, to hold property, to be free from government-imposed
monopolies, etc., that the Lochner-era court often protected.28 The
Lochner-era court, and, indeed today’s United States Supreme Court, also
protected other “natural rights” of a non-economic nature, but they fall
outside of the scope of this study.29 For the sake of convenience this Article
employs the term “economic liberties” in referring to these “natural rights
of an economic nature.”
For the most part the Lochner court protected economic liberties
through the Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth and Fifth amendments.
On the whole, state courts that have struck down economic regulations on
the grounds that they violate an individual’s economic liberties have also
27

This term, of course, relates back to English Enlightenment philosopher John Locke.
Locke argued that prior to the institution of government every man has the right to preserve
himself, and lacks the right to “take away or impair the life, or what tends to the
preservation of life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another.” JOHN LOCKE, THE
SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 6 (Thomas P. Peardon ed., Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc.
1952) (1690). That is, without government, one has a right to one’s own life, liberty, and
property, but not to governmental protection of them. For a discussion of “Lockean” rights
and their place in interpreting the United States Constitution see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
TAKINGS 10-18 (1985) (attempting to interpret the Takings Clause in a way “which is
consistent with the basic Lockean design); Randy E. Barnett, The Proper Scope of the
Police Power, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 429, 443 (2004) (“[T]he basic concept of natural
rights was clear: Natural or inherent rights are the rights persons have independent of those
they are granted by government . . . .”).
28
See cases listed infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text. Some scholars, most notably
Professor Sunstein, take the view that the Lochner-era Court was not in the business of
protecting Lockean rights so much as enforcing the proper scope of the police power set
against the baseline of the common law. See, e.g. Cass Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 873, 882 (1987). Another set have argued that Lochner era decisions
involved the judiciary’s attempt to combat class-legislation, and not to preserve laissezfaire. See, e.g., HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE
OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWER JURISPRUDENCE 6-10 (1993) (reviewing revisionist legal
historians and their contentions that the courts of the time scrutinized legislation through an
equality context). But see Barnett, supra note 27, at 489 (stating that Gillman misses how
“the resistance to class-based legislation was seen as a means to the protection of natural
rights, rather than an end in itself”). The Author notes these alternate views here, but
contends that they do not alter which cases should be included in this study. Whether the
cases in Appendix A were decided in order to protect the public from special interests, or in
order to defend the rights of certain members of the public, the end result is that the courts
struck down economic regulations and in so doing protected economic liberties.
29
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (right to engage in consensual
homosexual sodomy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (right of married
couples to purchase contraception); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402-03 (1923) (right
to learn a language of one’s choice); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 534-35
(1925) (right to educate one’s child in a private school).

7

8

ANTHONY B. SANDERS

grounded their opinions in due process clauses.30 This is not entirely true,
however. Many, many times state courts have struck down economic
regulations because the regulations are an illegitimate use of the “police
power.”31 The “police power” plays a central role because the government
will usually argue that its actions are justified under its authority to protect
the public health, safety, welfare, and morals—otherwise known as its
police power authority.32 This is especially true when it comes to courts
examining local ordinances. Often a state’s constitutional structure is such
that a local government only possesses the powers ceded to it by the state
legislature.33 One often-ceded power is that of promoting the public health
and safety, or some similar area.34 A court will typically inquire into what
this ceded “police power” encompasses and whether the challenged
governmental action is a valid, or invalid, use of the power.35 When a court
invalidates an economic regulation in this manner the result is the protection
of an economic liberty. For the same reasons this study includes cases that
do not mention the words “police power” or “due process” at all but merely
conclude that a regulation is “arbitrary and unreasonable,”36 or “not affected

30

See Howard, supra note 15, at 882.
See, e.g., Hand v. H & R Block, Inc.,
528 S.W.2d 916, 923 (Ark. 1975) (concluding
that franchise regulation was effectively a minimum price requirement and beyond the
state’s police power); United Interchange, Inc. of Mass. v. Harding, 145 A.2d 9497 (Me.
1958) (striking down bar on real estate advertising in magazines as beyond the police
power).
32
A typical description of the police power, and its legitimate uses, appearing in the cases
appearing in Appendix A is the following from the Florida Supreme Court’s opinion in
Larson v. Lesser, 106 So. 2d 188, 191 (Fla. 1958): “It requires no extensive citation of
authorities to support the proposition that in order to justify the exercise of the police
power the Legislature must be supported by some sound basis of necessity to protect the
public morals, health, safety or welfare.” Compare the very similar language from Lochner
itself: “It must, of course, be conceded that there is a limit to the valid exercise of the police
power by the State. . . . the question necessarily arises: Is this a fair, reasonable and
appropriate exercise of the police power of the State, or is it an unreasonable, unnecessary
and arbitrary interference with the right of the individual to his personal liberty . . . ?”
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905).
33
See, e.g., Mont. Const. art. XI §§ 4-6 (ceding limited power to local governments,
except when a local government specially petitions for greater powers, or where the
legislature grants them).
34
See, e.g., City of Osceola v. Blair, 2 N.W.2d 83, 84 (Iowa 1942) (noting the legislature’s
grant of power to municipal corporations “to pass ordinances necessary for the safety,
health, prosperity, order, comfort, convenience, etc., of its inhabitants”).
35
See, e.g., id. (characterizing ordinance as “an unreasonable restraint on a lawful
business”).
36
See, e.g., City of Jackson v. Murray-Reed-Slone & Co., 178 S.W.2d 847, 848 (Ky. 1944)
(determining ordinance preventing restaurant from opening between midnight and 4 a.m. is
arbitrary and unreasonable); Lutz v. Armour, 151 A.2d 108, 111 (Pa. 1959) (determining
31
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by a public interest.”37 The same is true for various other formulations state
supreme courts have used to strike down economic regulations without
citing to specific constitutional regulations.38 All of these formulations are
used to protect Lockean economic rights, and therefore this study includes
them.39
Lawyers whose entire experience with constitutional law consists of
reading the United States Constitution and Supreme Court interpretations of
it might be surprised to discover that “due process” clauses are only one of
the provisions through which state constitutions protect economic liberties.
Each state constitution presents, of course, a different text with different
clauses to interpret. Not only that, but a few state constitutions lack a “due
process” clause entirely.40 In spite of this, since 1940, courts in all states
lacking a due process clause have protected economic liberty through the
use of “economic substantive due process,”41 and courts in many others
have used constitutional clauses to protect economic liberty in addition to
their respective due process clauses.
The states lacking a “due process” clause usually have a “law of the
land” clause that its highest court has interpreted as possessing an identical
meaning to “due process.”42 In addition, some states have used other,
that ordinance banning the importation of garbage into a town is arbitrary and
unreasonable).
37
See, e.g., Estell v. City of Birmingham, 286 So.2d 872, 876 (Ala. 1973) (concluding antiscalping law to not be affected with a public interest and thus unconstitutional in the
limitations it places on ticket resellers); Strickland v. Ports Petroleum Co., Inc., 353 S.E.2d
17, 18 (Ga. 1987) (invalidating Below Sales Cost Act because the oil industry is not
affected with the public interest).
38
See, e.g. Dep’t of Ins. v. Motors Ins. Corp., 138 N.E.2d 157, 165 (Ind. 1956) (striking
down bar on automobile dealers also selling auto insurance on grounds that there was no
“good cause” for the law); Gillette Dairy, Inc. v. Neb. Dairy Prods. Bd., 219 N.W.2d 214,
221 (Neb. 1974) (concluding that dairy regulation act imposing maximum costs on
products “is an unnecessary and unwarranted interference with individual liberty”); Jones
v. Bontempo, 32 N.E.2d 17, 18 (Ohio 1941) (holding that ban on the advertising of
barbering prices interferes with property rights); Whittle v. State Bd. of Exam’rs of
Psychologists, 483 P.2d 328, 329-30 (Okla. 1971) (concluding that licensing procedures for
psychologist were unduly restrictive).
39
For a full discussion of the historical understanding of the “police power” and its relation
to the protection of natural rights, see sources cited supra in note 28.
40
See infra, note 42 and accompanying text.
41
The only three states that have not protected economic liberty through economic
substantive due process under state constitutional law since 1940 are Alaska, Hawai’i, and
Rhode Island. See infra Appendix B. The constitutions of all three have a “due process
clause.” See Alaska Const. art. I § 7; Hawai’i Const. art. I § 5; R.I. Const. art. I § 2.
42
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lyons, 492 N.E.2d 1142, 1144 (Mass. 1986 ) (“The phrase
‘law of the land’ does not refer to the statutory law of the Commonwealth, as it exists from
time to time. Rather, if refers, in language found in Magna Charta, to the concept of due
process of law.”); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 333 A.2d 888, 891 (Pa. 1975) (“It has been a
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sometimes unique, clauses to protect economic liberties. Since 1940 state
supreme courts have found economic regulations unconstitutional because
they violate Arkansas’ “Individual Liberty,”43 and anti-monopoly44 clauses,
Kentucky’s “Absolute and Arbitrary Power” Clause,45 Montana’s “Life’s
Basic Necessities” Clause,46 and Pennsylvania’s “Declaration of Rights,”47
to name a few. Many cases interpreting these clauses do essentially the
same thing: conclude that a regulation impermissibly violates an
individual’s economic liberties.48
For the sake of convenience, the rest of this Article refers to
“economic substantive due process” in referring to economic substantive
due process itself and the similar bases outlined above, including other
constitutional clauses interpreted to protect economic liberties, “police
power” cases, and “arbitrary and unreasonable” cases.
B.

What is not Included in This Study

Although this study includes cases where state supreme courts have
protected economic liberties under due process clauses, it purposely does
not include many other cases where state supreme courts have done much
the same thing under other clauses. A court may strike down an economic
regulation on, of course, a variety of constitutional grounds. For instance,
federal courts may employ the Due Process clauses of the Fifth and
long-standing tenet of Pennsylvania jurisprudence that ‘the law of the land’ in Article I,
Section 9 is synonymous with ‘due process of law.’”).
43
McCastlain v. R. & B. Tobacco Co., 411 S.W.2d 882, 885 (Ark. 1967) (determining
regulation requiring cigarette wholesaler to obtain letter of credit to offend the state
constitution’s Individual Liberty Clause).
44
North Little Rock Transp. Co. v. City of N. Little Rock, 184 S.W.2d 52, 54 (Ark. 1944)
(striking down taxi licensing scheme as a violation of state constitution’s anti-monopoly
clause).
45
Remote Services, Inc. v. FDR Corp., 764 S.W.2d 80, 83 (Ky. 1989) (striking down
minimum mark-up law as facially unconstitutional under “Absolute and Arbitrary Power”
Clause).
46
Wadsworth v. State, 911 P.2d 1165, 1174 (Mont. 1996) (invalidating, under a strict
scrutiny analysis, rule forbidding state employed property appraiser from working as an
independent realtor as violating right “to pursue life’s basic necessities”).
47
Commonwealth v. Zasloff, 13 A.2d 67, 72 (Pa. 1940) (declaring Fair Sale Act
unconstitutional under state Declaration of Rights).
48
An early article concerning economic substantive due process in state courts since the
demise of the Lochner era also lumped together “due process” cases proper, and those
protecting economic liberties through similar constitutional clauses. Paulsen, supra note
15, at 93 n.10 (“Throughout this article the phrase ‘due process’ has been used to refer to
clauses in state constitutions which are phrased differently from the Fourteenth
Amendment as well as those which are identical to it. . . . Whatever the wording these
clauses . . . have placed unspecified general limitations on legislative power.”).
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Fourteenth Amendments, but they also have at their disposal the Equal
Protection Clause,49 the Takings Clause,50 and the Contracts Clause.51 State
courts have utilized equivalents of all of these examples in striking down
economic regulations.52 However, just as they are under the United States
Constitution, state court interpretations of these various constitutional
provisions are historically distinct from the doctrine of economic
substantive due process. To include such clauses in this study would turn
the Article into a demonstration of how state courts protect economic
liberties at large, and not the more-focused question of how the
underpinnings of the Lochner court have survived to this day under state
constitutional law.
This study also does not include some instances of state supreme
courts striking down economic regulations under what might be labeled
substantive applications of a due process clause. One example is statutory
caps on tort damages.53 They are not examples of the protection of Lockean
rights but of the protection of governmental procedural guarantees.
Therefore, they fall outside the scope of this study.
Additionally, this study largely excludes review of local
governmental land use zoning decisions. The reason for the exclusion is
that courts often treat due process challenges to local land use zoning
decisions quite differently from review of other economic regulations.
Instead of a deferential rational basis test, where the regulation at issue is
heavily presumed to be constitutional, when it comes to land use zoning
courts often apply a mere “clear and convincing evidence” presumption.54
This is much less demanding than the traditional “rational-basis test.”55 The
49

U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 14 (“No state shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
50
U.S. Const. amend. V (“nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”).
51
U.S. Const. art. I § 10 (“No state shall . . . pass any . . . law impairing the obligation of
contracts.”).
52
See, e.g., Hasegawa v. Maui Pineapple Co., 475 P.2d 679 (Haw. 1970) (state equal
protection clause); County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 785 (Mich. 2004)
(state takings clause); Clem v. Christole, Inc., 582 N.E.2d 780 (Ind. 1991) (state contracts
clause).
53
Patricia J. Chupkovich, Comment: Statutory Caps: An Involuntary Contribution to the
Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis or a Reasonable Mechanism for Obtaining
Affordable Health Care?, 9 CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 337, 352-53 (1993) (discussing
cases).
54
See, e.g., La Salle Nat. Bank of Chicago v. County of Cook, 145 N.E.2d 65, 69 (1957)
(“A zoning ordinance is presumptively valid, this presumption may be overcome only by
clear and convincing evidence.”).
55
See, e.g., R.L. Jordan Co. v. Boardman Petroleum, Inc., 527 S.E.2d 763, 765 (S.C. 2000)
(adopting the deferential standard of “[w]hether [the statute being challenged] bears a
reasonable relationship to any legitimate interest of government”).
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affinity for applying economic substantive due process to land use zoning
even extends to the federal courts. Although the United States Supreme
Court has not done so, many federal district and circuit courts, even in
recent years, have overturned land use zoning decisions on Fourteenth
Amendment economic substantive due process grounds.56 These decisions
do apply the federal rational basis test, but nonetheless often result in the
invalidation of the questioned regulation. Regarding this strange quirk in
constitutional law, one commentator has noted that “federal courts have
allowed economic substantive due process—an endangered species of
constitutional doctrine—to escape extinction (and in some instances even to
flourish) within the ecosystem that is land development law.”57 Including
land use zoning decisions in this study would therefore mix different
doctrines together, similarly to including equal protection or takings cases.
It would not yield a representative account of recent trends in the doctrine
of economic substantive due process.
This is not to say that all “zoning” cases were excluded from this
study. Just because a court or city council labels a regulation as “land use”
or “zoning” does not mean it is a regulation that courts treat differently in
economic substantive due process challenges. For instance, included is the
Pennsylvania case Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment.58
There, the local government sought to ban the operation of all quarries in a
township.59 Such a total exclusion is more akin to a ban on the practice of
an occupation60 than, for example, a decision to zone a plot of land as
residential rather than commercial.61 Because these “zoning” decisions are
more akin to economic substantive due process cases in the non-zoning
arena, this study includes them.62
56

See Robert Ashbrook, Comment: Land Development, the Graham Doctrine, & the
Extinction of Economic Substantive Due Process, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1255, 1257 (2002).
57
Id.
58
228 A.2d 169, 182 (Pa. 1967).
59
See id. at 172.
60
See, e.g., Delight Wholesale Co. v. City of Overland Park, 453 P.2d 82, 87 (Kan. 1969)
(holding that the absolute prohibition of “huckstering and peddling” is beyond the police
power).
61
See, e.g., Lake County v. MacNeal, 181 N.E.2d 85, 92, (Ill. 1962) (determining that
zoning of lakeside property to be residential is not reasonably related to “the public health,
safety, welfare or morals”).
62
Other examples include U.S. Mining & Exploration Natural Res. Co. v. City of
Beattyville, 548 S.W.2d 833, 835 (Ky. 1977) (holding that a coal tipple may not be
completely prohibited); State v. Brown, 108 S.E.2d 74, 78 (N.C. 1959) (striking down
restrictions on operation of junk yards on the grounds that the law was only justified on
aesthetic grounds, and such grounds are not enough to invoke the police power), overruled
by State v. Jones, 290 S.E.2d 675, 677 (N.C. 1982). Also included are cases involving
state government (as opposed to local government) land use zoning regulations. See, e.g.,
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BACKGROUND: THE RISE OF FALL OF LOCHNER AND HOW THE
DOCTRINE SURVIVED IN STATE COURTS

The roots of the story of economic substantive due process under
state constitutional law trail back to the founding of the Republic and
beyond. Rather than belabor a history already voluminously treated
elsewhere in the literature this Part notes only the essential highlights.63 It
then provides an overview of economic substantive due process under state
constitutional law since the New Deal, focusing on some of the areas of
economic life where state courts have been particularly active in applying
the doctrine.
A.

Early Protections of Economic Liberty and the Lochner Era

At least since Justice Chase’s dictum in Calder v. Bull, American
courts have recognized the principle of judicial review in interpreting the
economic policies of legislatures.64 In the years preceding the Civil War,
whether in the guise of due process clauses, takings clauses, contracts
clauses, or other provisions of the United States Constitution and the
constitutions of the several states, federal and state courts frequently struck
down economic regulations as infringing the People’s economic liberties.65
The opportunity for protection of economic liberties greatly expanded after
the Civil War with the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment and its
Privilege or Immunities, Due Process, and Equal Protection clauses.66 After
the narrow reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause in The
Slaughterhouse Cases of 1872, it appeared that the Fourteenth Amendment
State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711, 716 (Me. 1970) (holding that denial of permit under the
state Wetlands Act violates substantive due process).
63
See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 560-86 (2d ed. 1988);
Gillman, supra note 28, passim.
64
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.) (stating that it
would offend “all justice and reason” to allow a legislature to take from A and give to B).
65
See, e.g., Note, supra note 15, at 312 n.20 (“Before the Civil War the due process clauses
of state constitutions were frequently used to invalidate actions of the legislatures which
would now be called adjudicative in character. . . . Thus due process came to mean that the
courts would not enforce any legislation which was not prospective in character and
general in application.”); Paulsen, supra note 15, at 93 (“The doctrine of substantive due
process was not invented in 1890 by the federal courts. Clear traces of the concept can be
found in state court opinions applying state constitutional provisions before the Civil
War.”).
66
See Kimberly c. Shankman & Roger Pilon, 3 TEX. REV. LAW & POL. 1, 3 (1998)
(discussing the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment and the protections that grew out
of it).
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would not be read expansively so as to protect the American citizenry’s
economic liberties.67 However, by 1887 it was becoming clear that the
Supreme Court was open to a more expansive reading of the Due Process
Clause,68 and in 1897, with Allgeyer v. Louisiana,69 the Court opened a
forty-year period of regularly protecting economic liberties through a
substantive reading of that clause.70 The most famous of these opinions,
Lochner v. New York,71 gave the period its name: the Lochner era.
The United States Supreme Court was not alone in this enterprise.
Various state supreme courts led the way in this post-Civil War endeavor,
striking down economic regulations when the courts judged that they
violated the economic liberties retained by the people and protected by state
constitutions.72 Once the Lochner era was underway, the two levels of
judiciary worked hand-in-hand, with state courts protecting economic
liberties through both the United States Constitution and their respective
state constitutions.73
Then, at least as abruptly as it began, the Lochner era came to an
end. In 1934, while upholding a milk price-support law, the Court in
Nebbia v. New York articulated that as long as a rational basis existed for an
economic regulation it was not its business to determine it
unconstitutional.74 Then, in 1937, the Court signaled the end of substantive
due process review in West Coast Hotel by concluding that it was within the
state’s police power authority to enact minimum wage legislation,
overruling the precedent of Adkins v. Children’s Hospital that it had relied
67

SlaughterHouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 79-80 (1873) (defining the “Privileges or
Immunities” of American citizens to merely consist of the right to travel to the nation’s seat
of government, use navigable waters, and various other narrow rights).
68
See Mulger v. Kansas 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887) (stating that although the liquor
regulation at issue was constitutional, mentioning in dicta that courts must come to their
own conclusions on whether legislation is a proper exercise of the police power).
69
Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 590 (1897).
70
See Michael J. Phillips, The Slow Return of Economic Substantive Due Process, 49
SYRACUSE L. REV. 917, 919 (1999) (discussing the use of economic substantive due
process from the 1890s through the 1930s).
71
198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905).
72
See, e.g., In the Matter of Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98, 112-115 (N.Y. 1885) (restrictions on cigar
making); Millett v. People, 7 N.E. 631, 636 (1886) (requirement that coal-mining contracts
be regulated by weight).
73
State court opinions of the time include State v. Goldstein, 93 So. 308, 314 (Ala. 1922)
(price-control measure); State v. Legendre, 70 So. 70, 71 (La. 1915) (firemen working
hours). Federal opinions include New State Ice, Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 277
(1932) (state-imposed ice vendor monopoly); Louis K. Liggett, Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S.
105, 113 (1928) (pharmacy ownership restriction); Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S.
525, 562 (1923) (minimum wage law for women); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26
(1915) (bar on employers forbidding union membership).
74
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1934).

14

THE “NEW JUDICIAL FEDERALISM” BEFORE ITS
TIME

15

upon only a year earlier.75 The Court has not struck down an economic
regulation on substantive due process grounds since West Coast Hotel.76
It was perhaps not immediately apparent after 1937 that this new
deference would allow no practical opportunity to strike down economic
regulations under a substantive reading of the Due Process Clause.77 After
all, even if the new “rational basis” review made it harder to protect
economic liberties, it was by no means an outlandish proposition to argue
that such a possibility still existed. Soon, however, that view grew much
harder to maintain. In 1941, in upholding a Nebraska regulation limiting
the price employment agencies may charge their customers, Justice Douglas
announced for the Court, “There is no necessity for the state to demonstrate
before us that evils persist despite the competition which attends the
bargaining in this field.”78 The only constitutional limits on the legislation
were notions of policy and “[s]ince [the notions] do not find expression in
the Constitution, we cannot give them continuing vitality as standards by
which the constitutionality of the economic and social programs of the
states is to be determined.”79 Following this black-and-white language,80 in
the next two decades, and up through the present day, the Court has resisted
any urge to bring back some of the life of Lochner, instead emphatically
concluding that it will not sit as a “superlegislature” in judging the wisdom
of economic regulations.81
B.

Persistence in the State Courts after the Lochner Era

For whatever reason, the state courts didn’t get the memo. From
1937 until now, state courts have continued to protect economic liberty
through applying substantive due process to economic regulations. In
75

West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937). The case from one year before,
the last instance of the Court protecting economic liberty through economic substantive due
process, was Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo. 298 U.S. 587, 609 (1936).
76
Tussusov, supra note 18, at 536.
77
See Note, supra note 15, at 315 (arguing that the rational basis analysis offered by
Nebbia and West Coast Hotel was interpreted by some courts to merely mean a more
deferential level of scrutiny, not abandonment of economic substantive due process).
78
Olson v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 246 (1941).
79
Id. at 247.
80
As one commentator put it, after such a statement “[s]tate courts could no longer
legitimately claim that any form of trade regulation violated fourteenth amendment due
process . . . .” Note, supra note 15, at 316.
81
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732 (1963). The Court often has left open the
possibility, however nominal, that it could strike down an economic regulation if it truly
were irrational. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487-91 (1955); Sanders,
supra note 15, at 672-73 (arguing that the Supreme Court has continued to leave open the
possibility, following the method of Lee Optical and not Ferguson.).
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addition to utilizing the various constitutional methods discussed earlier,82
state courts have often concluded that a regulation violates the United States
Constitution as well. They have done so even after the Supreme Court
made it crystal clear that this would constitute an incorrect application of
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.83
1.

The Inability of State Courts to Let Go

Although this Article concerns state constitutional law, it is worth
briefly reviewing state court use of the Fourteenth Amendment in protecting
economic liberty since 1940.84 As is quite common in much constitutional
litigation in state courts, many cases consider whether a statute violates the
state and United States constitutions.85 If a state court concludes, as they
often have in the decades following 1937,86 that a law violates both
constitutions there exists a presumption that the case may not be appealed to
the United States Supreme Court. This is because reversing the holding on
Fourteenth Amendment grounds would not change the fact that the law is
still unconstitutional on “adequate and independent” state constitutional
grounds.87 Therefore, state courts are generally insulated in concluding that
an economic regulation violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause as long as they similarly conclude when interpreting the state
constitution.
These insulated holdings give us a glimpse into the mindset of state
justices in the years following the close of the Lochner era. Many of these
cases relied upon the most “infamous” Lochner era opinions, including
82

See supra Part I.A.
See, e.g., infra Part I.B.2.a (describing state court invalidation of fair trade acts after the
United State Supreme Court had concluded they did not violate economic substantive due
process).
84
The relevant language of the Fourteenth Amendment states: “nor shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. 14
§ 1.
85
This is because counsel often raise both federal and state constitutional arguments or
defenses. See Kirby, supra note 10, at 252 (“[C]onstitutional challenges to economic
regulations can be, and usually are, made on both state and federal constitutional
grounds.”).
86
See infra notes 135-146 and accompanying text.
87
See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1042 (1983). Under Long, there exists the
possibility the United States Supreme Court may grant review when a state court may
ostensibly strikes down a law under its own constitution, but the interpretation is so reliant
on federal law that “it is not clear from the opinion itself that the state court relief upon an
adequate and independent state ground . . . .” Id. See also Kirby, supra note 10, at 243
(stating adequate and independent state grounds standard); Tussusov, supra note 18, at 530
n.6 (discussing an arguable reversal of the presumption in Long).
83

16

THE “NEW JUDICIAL FEDERALISM” BEFORE ITS
TIME

17

Liggett v. Baldridge,88 New State Ice v. Lieberman,89 and even Lochner
itself.90 The state justices knew, of course, about the renunciation of the
method of these cases in opinions such as West Coast Hotel,91 Olson v.
Nebraska,92 Lee Optical,93 and Ferguson.94 It appears, however, that they
just did not care. They relied on these Lochner era precedents not just as
persuasive authority in interpreting their own state constitutions, but in
interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment. In case after case, state courts
played the part of an ostrich, burying their heads in the pages of pre-1937
case reporters and proceeding as though these Lochner era precedents were
still “good law” in interpreting the United States Constitution.
But under state constitutions, good law they often were. As
discussed in more detail below, in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s the highest
courts of appeal in almost every state struck down state statutes and local
ordinances as violating economic substantive due process.95 The number of
cases where a state supreme court protected economic liberty through use of
the doctrine in the 1950s actually exceeded—far and away exceeded—the
number of similar cases of the 1940s.96 Furthermore, the number of cases
in the 1960s was less than that of the 1950s, but equaled that of the 1940s.97
Thus, thirty years after the United States Supreme Court had emphatically
stated that it was not in the business of protecting economic liberties
through economic substantive due process, the supreme courts of many

88

278 U.S. 105, 113 (1928). Post-1940 citations to Liggett by a state court using economic
substantive due process to protect economic liberty include City and County of Denver v.
Thrailkill, 244 P.2d 1074, 1080 (Colo. 1952);. Dep’t of Fin. Insts. v. Holt, 108 N.E.2d 629,
635 (Ind. 1952).
89
285 U.S. 262, 277 (1932). Similar citations to New State Ice include General Electric
Co. v. Wahle, 296 P.2d 635, 647 (Or. 1956); In re Aston Park, 193 S.E.2d , 729, 735 (N.C.
1973).
90
198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905). Other examples include Edwards v. State Board of Barber
Examiners, 231 P.2d 450, 453 (Ariz. 1951); State Board of Barber Examiners v. Cloud, 44
N.E.2d 972, 980 (Ind. 1942).
91
West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937); see supra notes 75-76 and
accompanying text.
92
313 U.S. 236, 246-47 (1941); see supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
93
Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487-91 (1955).
94
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732 (1963).
95
See infra notes 135-146 and accompanying text; see also Appendix A (listing economic
substantive due process cases since 1940 by state).
96
See infra discussion, notes 136-137 and accompanying text; Appendix B.
97
See infra notes 136-137; Appendix B. In 1963 a commentator could confidently (and, at
that time, correctly) assert that, “The increasing frequency of [economic substantive due
process] decisions indicates that economic due process is neither dead nor dying and that it
is the United States Supreme Court, rather than the state courts, which is resisting the
current drift in constitutional interpretation.” Note, supra note 15, at 321.
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states either ignored or openly thumbed their nose at the new jurisprudence
of the highest court in the land.
This level of defiance did not last forever, although it continues
today at a much-diminished frequency. The number of cases where state
supreme courts protected economic liberties through applying economic
substantive due process in the 1970s fell considerably when compared to
the 1960s, and by the 1980s only a handful of states continued to strike
down economic regulations on substantive due process grounds, and then
only on occasion.98 Some states repudiated their earlier adherence to
Lochner era protections of economic liberties,99 while in others a
heightened degree of protection still stands as good law, but is rarely called
upon.100 For reasons that are a bit unclear, but briefly examined below, the
adherence to Lochner era protection of economic liberties could not sustain
itself at such a strong level for more than three decades after West Coast
Hotel.101
It is important to note that although the level of protection afforded
by state courts since 1937 has greatly exceeded that of the modern United
States Supreme Court, there are few examples of state supreme courts
striking down economic regulations with the regularity that the United
States Supreme Court did during the Lochner era. Although scholars have
greatly inflated the “activism” of the pre-1937 Court over the years,102 the
Court regularly struck down economic regulations on substantive due
process grounds at the rate of just over one per year.103 Since 1940 only the
1950s Florida Supreme Court has approached that level of activity.104
2.

Areas of Protection Extended Under State Economic Substantive
Due Process

98

See infra Appendix B.
See states discussed supra Part III.B; see also David Smith, Economic Substantive Due
Process in Arizona: A Survey, 20 Ariz. St. L.J. 327,341 (stating that the Arizona Supreme
Court has adopted a “rational basis test” in examining economic substantive due process
claims).
100
See states discussed supra Part III.A.
101
See infra Part IV (hypothesizing that the rise of the United State Supreme Court’s “right
to privacy” jurisprudence undermined support for economic substantive due process).
102
See Michael J. Phillips, How Many Times Was Lochner-Era Substantive Due Process
Effective?, 48 MERCER L. REV. 1049, 1080 (1997) (documenting that the number of state
regulations invalidated under economic substantive due process during the Lochner era was
a total of fifty-five and not the 200 claimed elsewhere).
103
See id.
104
See infra Appendix B; Part III.A.1 (discussing the Florida Supreme Court’s heavy use
of economic substantive due process when compared to other state courts of highest
review).
99
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Since 1940, the year the research underlying this Article begins,
state supreme courts have used economic substantive due process to protect
economic liberty in all manner of areas of economic life. The examples
range from bans on frog gigging105 to price controls on cigarettes.106 The
reach of the cases is so wide-ranging that it is difficult to categorize all of
them into discrete subject areas. Nevertheless, a few subjects stand out. To
gain a full appreciation for the breadth and impact of the material
underlying the trends discussed below in Part III, the remainder of this
Section outlines a few areas where state courts have been particularly active
in applying the doctrine of economic substantive due process. These areas
are state fair trade acts, advertising restrictions, price controls, occupational
licensing, and Sunday closing laws.
a.

Fair Trade Acts

More than any other area, the state court treatment of fair trade acts
stands out as an example of the “New Judicial Federalism” in the economic
substantive due process arena. Legislation generally known as “fair trade
acts” allowed suppliers of goods “sold under a trademark, trade name, or
brand name to regulate by contract the price at which their products were
sold at retail.”107 What often undermined the acts’ constitutionality was the
inclusion of a “nonsigner clause” which allowed a supplier to sue a seller
for trading for less than the contract price even if the seller was not a party
to the contract.108 In 1936, in the twilight of the Lochner era, the United
States Supreme Court upheld Illinois’ fair trade act as constitutional under
the Fourteenth Amendment.109 However, between 1940 and 1975, when
Congress amended the Sherman Act so as to once again110 prohibit such
105

See City of Shreveport v. Curry, 357 So. 2d 1078, 1083 (La. 1978) (declaring that ban
on frog gigging for eleven months out of the year violates substantive due process).
106
See Serrer v. Cigarette Serv. Co., 76 N.E.2d 91, 91 (Ohio 1947) (determining that
Unfair Cigarette Sales Act does not take into account different operating costs amongst
wholesalers and therefore violates substantive due process).
107
Robert H. Jerry, II & Reginald L. Robinson, Statutory Prohibitions on the Negotiation
of Insurance Agent Commissions: Substantive Due Process Review Under State
Constitutions, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 773, 803 (1990).
108
See id. Even though not a signer, if the trademark holder wished to enforce the contract
price the nonsigning reseller would have to have knowledge of the contract. See Howard,
supra note 15, at 883 n.46.
109
Old Dearborn Co. Distrib. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183, 193 (1936).
110
Originally, the Supreme Court had concluded that contracts between wholesalers and
retailers fixing the price sold to consumers were a “restraint of trade” and violated the
Sherman Act. See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 400,
407-09 (1911) Much later, Congress amended the law to allow states to provide for such
contracts. See Miller-Tydings Act, 50 Stat. 693 (1937). In 1975, Congress changed its
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state legislation, at least twenty-one state supreme courts struck down fair
trade acts on economic substantive due process grounds.111 Interestingly,
the history of judicial invalidation of fair trade acts is evidence of the
acceleration of economic substantive due process under state constitutional
law even as the country moved away from the New Deal. By 1956 only
four states had declared such legislation unconstitutional under economic
substantive due process.112 Again, by 1975 that number had grown
exponentially.
b.

Advertising Restrictions

Almost as many state supreme courts have used economic
substantive due process to invalidate state restrictions on advertising,
particularly the advertising of prices. The state courts decided most of the
relevant cases before the United States Supreme Court recognized that the
First Amendment protects commercial speech.113 Therefore, today state
courts would find many of the regulations at issue in these cases
unconstitutional under the United States Constitution, and can avoid the
mind, and re-enacted the prohibition. See Consumer Goods Pricing Act, 89 Stat. 801
(1975) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 45 (2004)); see also Jerry & Robinson,
supra note 107, 802-03 (discussing congressional history).
111
See, e.g., Bulova Watch Co. v. Zale Jewelry Co., 147 So.2d 797, 799 (Ala. 1962); Union
Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. White River Distribs., 275 S.W.2d 455, 461 (Ark. 1955); Olin
Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. Francis, 301 P.2d 139, 152 (Colo. 1956); Miles Labs., Inc. v.
Eckerd, 73 So.2d 680, 682 (Fla. 1954); Cox v. Gen. Elec. Co., 85 S.E.2d 514, 519 (Ga.
1955); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Am. Buyers Corp., 316 S.W.2d 354, 361 (Ky. 1958); Opinion of
the Justices, 132 A.2d 47, 49 (Me. 1957); Loughran v. Lord Baltimore Candy & Tobacco
Co., 12 A.2d 201, 207 (Md. 1940); Shakespeare Co. v. Lippman’s Tool Shop Sporting
Goods Co., 54 N.W.2d 268, 269-70 (Mich. 1952); Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v.
Skaggs Drug Center, Inc., 359 P.2d 644, 654 (Mont. 1961); McGraw Elec. Co. v. Lewis &
Smith Drug Co., 159 Neb. 703, 721-22, 68 N.W.2d 608, 618 (Neb. 1955); Zale-Las Vegas,
Inc. v. Bulova Watch Co., 396 P.2d 683, 693 (Nev. 1964); Skaggs Drug Center v. Gen.
Elec. Co., 315 P.2d 967, 974 (N.M 1957); Bulva Watch Co. v. Brand Distrib., Inc., 206
S.E.2d 141, 151 (N.C. 1974); Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Bargain Fair, Inc., 147
N.E.2d 481, 484 (Ohio 1958); Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Homsey, 361 P.2d 297, 303
(Okla. 1961); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wahle, 296 P.2d 635, 647 (Or. 1956); Commonwealth v.
Zasloff, 13 A.2d 67, 72 (Pa. 1940); Rogers-Kent, Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 99 S.E.2d 665, 672
(S.C. 1957); Remington Arms Co. v. Skaggs, 345 P.2d 1085, 1090-91 (Wa. 1959); Gen.
Elec. Co. v. Dandy Appliance Co., 103 S.E.2d 310, 313 (W.Va. 1958); Bulova Watch Co.
v. Zale Jewelry Co. of Cheyenne, 371 P.2d 409, 420-21. Prior studies have contended that
a full majority of states supreme courts did so since 1936. See Howard, supra note 15, at
883 (citing 2 CCH TRADE REG. REP. ¶ 6041 (Mar. 15, 1976)). This, of course, may be
correct as the present study only begins in 1940.
112
See Howard, supra note 15, at 883.
113
See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
757 (1976).
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“Lochner label” by instead applying the commercial speech doctrine.114
The pre-commercial speech cases themselves usually involved very little
discussion, if any, of free speech, and instead emphasized property rights
and the arbitrariness of governmental power.115 At least fifteen state
supreme courts have struck down advertising regulations since 1940 on
state economic substantive due process grounds.116 Many involve whether
gas stations may advertise prices,117 and several others concern advertising
by specific occupations.118
c.

Price Controls

114

Compare Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Servs. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 566 (1980) (demanding a “substantial” governmental interest to justify the regulation)
with Stadnik v. Shell's City, Inc., 140 So. 2d 871, 875 (Fla. 1962) (holding regulation
banning the advertising of prescription drugs to have no rational basis). Had Central
Hudson been available to the Stadnik court, it would not have had to justify the invalidation
of the regulation through using the rational basis test.
115
See, e.g., City of Lafayette v. Justus, 161 So.2d 747, 749 (La. 1964) (striking down ban
on advertising gasoline prices as restriction violates substantive due process); Levy v.
Pontiac, 49 N.W.2d 80, 82-83 (Mich. 1951) (striking down restriction on the size of
gasoline price signs as violating substantive due process).
116
See, e.g., Ala. Indep. Serv. Station Ass’n v. McDowell, 6 So.2d 502, 507 (Ala. 1942);
Mott’s Super Markets, Inc. v. Frassinelli, 172 A.2d 381, 386 (Conn. 1961); State v.
Hobson, 83 A.2d 846, 858-59 (Del. 1951); State ex rel. Walters v. Blackburn, 104 So.2d
19, 20-21 (Fla. 1958); Needham v. Proffit, 41 N.E.2d 606, 607 (Ind. 1942); Sears, Roebuck
and Co. v. City of New Orleans, 117 So.2d 64, 66 (La. 1960); United Interchange, Inc. of
Mass. v. Harding, 145 A.2d 94, 97 (Me. 1958); Md. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Sav-A-Lot, Inc.,
311 A.2d 242, 252 (Md. 1973); Levy v. Pontiac, 49 N.W.2d 80, 82-83 (Mich. 1951); State
v. Redman Petroleum Corp., 360 P.2d 842, 845, 846 (Nev. 1961); State v. Boston Juvenile
Shoes, 288 A.2d 7, 11 (N.J. 1972); Jones v. Bontempo, 32 N.E.2d 17, 18 (Ohio 1941);
Little Pep Delmonico Rest., Inc. v. Charlotte, 113 S.E.2d 422, 423 (N.C. 1960), overruled
by State v. Jones, 290 S.E.2d 675, 677 (N.C. 1982); Jones v. Bontempo, 32 N.E.2d 17, 18
(Ohio 1941); Pa. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Pastor, 272 A.2d 487, 490, 495 (Pa. 1971); Pride
Oil Co. v. Salt Lake County, 370 P.2d 355, 356-57 (Utah 1962).
117
See, e.g., State v. Miller, 12 A.2d 192, ___ (Conn. 1940) (concluding that prohibition on
gas station price signs is unconstitutional); State ex rel. Walters v. Blackburn, 104 So.2d
19, 20-21 (Fla. 1958); Pride Oil Co. v. Salt Lake County, 370 P.2d 355, 356-57 (Utah
1962) (concluding that restriction on the placement of gas price signs violates the right to
own and enjoy property).
118
See, e.g., Amsel v. Brooks, 106 A.2d 152, 158 ( Conn. 1954) (concluding restriction
on dental advertising has no reasonable relation to the public welfare); Needham v. Proffit,
41 N.E.2d 606, 607 (Ind. 1942) (concluding that ban on print advertisements of funeral
directors and embalmers is unconstitutional); Jones v. Bontempo, 32 N.E.2d 17, 18 (Ohio
1941) (holding that ban on the advertising of barbering prices interferes with property
rights).
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Invalidating regulations on prices, whether in striking down
minimum wage laws119 or in nullifying price supports for commodities,120
was a bread-and-butter practice of the Lochner-era Court. Unsurprisingly,
such behavior has also characterized state constitutional protection of
economic liberties since 1940. At least nineteen state supreme courts have
concluded that certain controls on prices violate economic substantive due
process under their respective state constitutions.121 The United States
Supreme Court concluded in Nebbia that price supports are constitutional
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause as long as they are
rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.122 In concluding
otherwise under their own constitutions, state courts have often ignored
Nebbia, sometimes explicitly adopting the reasoning of Justice
McReynolds’ dissenting opinion.123 This is not to say that state courts have
brazenly invalidated price controls across the board. For example, in many
of the cases involving prohibitions on sales below cost—the sale of an item
for less than its original purchase price—courts have carefully held that
sales below cost may be made illegal, but only when the seller has the
“predatory intent” to undermine a competitor.124
119

See Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 609 (1936); Adkins v.
Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 562 (1923).
120
See, e.g., Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235, 239 (1929) (gasoline prices).
121
See, e.g., Ports Petroleum Co., Inc. of Ohio v. Tucker, 916 S.W.2d 749, 751 (Ark.1996);
Edwards v. State Bd. of Barber Exam’rs, 231 P.2d 450, 453-54 (Ariz. 1951); State Bd. of
Dry Cleaners v. Thrift-D-Lux Cleaners, 254 P.2d 29, 36 (Cal. 1953); Mott’s Super Mkts.,
Inc. v. Frassinelli, 172 A.2d 381, 386 (Conn. 1961); Batton-Jackson Oil Co., Inc. v.
Reeves, 340 S.E.2d 16, 18-19 (Ga. 1986); Dep’t of Fin. Insts. v. Holt, 108 N.E.2d 629, 637
(Ind. 1952); State ex rel. Anderson v. Fleming Co., 339 P.2d 12, 18 (Kan. 1959); Remote
Servs., Inc. v. FDR Corp., 764 S.W.2d 80, 83 (Ky. 1989); City of Lafayette v. Justus, 161
So.2d 747, 749 (La. 1964); Wiley v. Sampson-Ripley Co., 120 A.2d 289, 291 (Me. 1956);
Traveler’s Indemnity Co. v. Comm’r of Ins., 265 N.E.2d 90, 92 (Mass. 1970); Gillette
Dairy, Inc. v. Neb. Dairy Prods. Bd., 219 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Neb. 1974); Serrer v. Cigarette
Service Co., 76 N.E.2d 91, 91 (Ohio 1947); Englebrecht v. Day, 208 P.2d 538, 544 (Okla.
1949); Richbourg’s Shoppers Fair, Inc. v. Stone, 153 S.E.2d 895, 899 (S.C. 1967),
overruled by R.L. Jordan Co., Inc. v. Boardman Petroleum, Inc., 527 S.E.2d 763, 765 (S.C.
2000); San Antonio Retail Grocers, Inc. v. Lafferty, 297 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1957); State v.
Wender, 141 S.E.2d 359, 363 (W.Va. 1965), overruled by Hartsock-Flsher Candy Co. v.
Wheeling Wholesale Grocery Co., 328 S.E.2d 144, 150 (W.Va. 1984).
122
See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1934).
123
Gwynette v. Myers, 115 S.E.2d 673, 679 (S.C. 1960) (stating that the court agreed with
the Nebbia dissent’s contention that prices may only be regulated if the industry is affected
with the public interest), overruled by R.L. Jordan Co., Inc. v. Boardman Petroleum, Inc.,
527 S.E.2d 763, 765 (S.C. 2000).
124
See, e.g., Ports Petroleum Co., Inc. of Ohio v. Tucker, 916 S.W.2d 749, 751 (Ark.1996)
(striking down, as a violation of substantive due process, an anti-predatory pricing law that
failed to require a showing of predatory intent); State ex rel. Anderson v. Fleming Co., 339
P.2d 12, 18 (Kan. 1959) (declaring milk sales law unconstitutional where legislation
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Occupational Licensing

More than in any other field, except perhaps for review of local land
use regulation,125 state courts in the post-Lochner era have utilized
economic substantive due process to protect the right to make a living.
State supreme courts have invalidated licensing laws outright (including
those extending exclusive monopolies or completely banning certain
professions),126 or have determined them to be too restrictive because they
require unreasonable prerequisites in order to gain a license.127 Overall,
thirty state supreme courts, three-fifths of the several states, have protected
the right to make a living through nullifying licensing or pseudo-licensing
laws.128 Many courts did so in the 1940s, still perhaps believing that the
criminalized selling below cost even when the seller lacked the intent to sell below cost);
Englebrecht v. Day, 208 P.2d 538, 544 (Okla. 1949) (striking down law banning belowcost sales as violating substantive due process because the law included sales made without
intent to harm competitors).
125
As explained above, the invalidation of local land use decisions are not included in this
study. See supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
126
See, e.g., North Little Rock Transp. Co. v. City of No. Little Rock, 184 S.W.2d 52, 54
(Ark. 1944) (striking down taxi licensing scheme as a violation of state constitution’s antimonopoly clause).
127
See, e.g., Cleere v. Bullock, 361 P.2d 616, 621 (Colo. 1961) (concluding licensing
scheme requiring funeral directors to be qualified embalmers to be beyond the police
power).
128
See, e.g., Lisenba v. Griffin, 8 So.2d 175, 177 (Ala. 1942); Buehman v. Bechtel, 114
P.2d 227, 232 (Ariz. 1941); North Little Rock Transp. Co. v. City of No. Little Rock, 184
S.W.2d 52, 54 (Ark. 1944); Abdoo v. City and County of Denver, 397 P.2d 222, 223 (Colo.
1964); Hart v. Bd. of Exam’rs of Embalmers, 26 A.2d 780, 782 (Conn. 1942); Sullivan v.
DeCerb, 23 So.2d 571, 572 (Fla. 1945); Berry v. Summers, 283 P.2d 1093, 1096 (Idaho
1955); Church v. State, 646 N.E.2d 572, 580, (Ill. 1995); City of Osceola v. Blair, 2
N.W.2d 83, 85 (Iowa 1942); Delight Wholesale Co. v. City of Overland Park, 453 P.2d 82,
87 (Kan. 1969); City of Mt. Sterling v. Donaldson Baking Co., 155 S.W.2d 237, 239 (Ky.
1941); City of Shreveport v. Restivo, 491 So.2d 377, 380 (La. 1986); Opinion of the
Justices, 79 N.E.2d 883, 888 (Mass. 1948); Moore v. Grillis, 39 So.2d 505, 509, 512 (Miss.
1949); State v. Gleason, 277 P.2d 530,533-34 (Mont. 1954); Jewel Tea Co. v. City of
Geneva, 291 N.W. 664, 670 (Neb. 1940); State v. Moore, 13 A.2d 143, 148 (N.H. 1940);
N.J. Good Humor, Inc. v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Borough of Bradley Beach, 11 A.2d 113, 118
(N.J. 1940); Good Humor Corp. v. City of New York, 49 N.E.2d 153, 157 (N.Y. 1943);
Roller v. Allen, 96 S.E.2d 851, 859 (N.C. 1957); State v. Cromwell, 9 N.W.2d 914, 922
(N.D. 1943); Frecker v. Dayton, 90 N.E.2d 851, 854 (Ohio 1950); Whittle v. State Bd. of
Exam’rs of Psychologists, 483 P.2d 328, 329-30 (Okla. 1971); Hertz Corp. v. Heltzel, 341
P.2d 1063, 1069 (Or. 1959); Olan Mills, Inc. v. Sharon, 92 A.2d 222, 224 (Pa. 1952); City
of Rapid City v. Schmitt, 71 N.W.2d 297, 298 (S.D. 1955); Livesay v. Tenn. Bd. of
Exam’rs in Watchmaking, 322 S.W.2d 209, 213 (Tenn. 1959); Vermont Salvage Corp. v.
St. Johnsbury, 34 A.2d 188, 197 (Vt. 1943); Moore v. Sutton, 39 S.E.2d 348, 351-52 (Va.
1946); Thorne v. Roush, 261 S.E.2d 72, 75 (W.Va. 1979).
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Lochner era had not drawn to a close, but other examples present
themselves up through the present day.129
e.

Sunday Closing Laws

Whereas the invalidation of many advertising restrictions by state
courts under economic substantive due process review presaged the United
States Supreme Court invalidating many such restrictions under the First
Amendment’s Free Speech Clause,130 the invalidation of Sunday closing
laws by many state courts has occurred in spite of the Supreme Court’s
refusal to strike down such laws as per se violations of the First
Amendment’s Establishment Clause.131 The Supreme Court has held that a
legislature may mandate a uniform day of rest as long as it is for a secular
purpose and does not substantially burden one’s religion.132 Ten state
supreme courts, however, often caring not a whit whether the law possesses
a religious purpose, have struck down Sunday closing laws as unreasonable
and anticompetitive.133 This is an area of economic substantive due process
that has weathered the passage of time much better than others, as several
cases were decided in recent decades.134
III.

WHICH STATES HAVE ENFORCED ECONOMIC SUBSTANTIVE DUE
PROCESS PROTECTIONS AND WHEN

As stated above,135 and set forth in detail in the Appendixes, the
persistence of economic substantive due process review under state
constitutional law in state supreme courts during the 1940s, 1950s, and
129

See, e.g., Church v. State, 646 N.E.2d 572, 580, (Ill. 1995) (determining private alarm
contractor licensing scheme unconstitutional as invalid use of the police power); Nixon v.
Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 839 A.2d 277, 290 (Pa. 2003) (concluding that law restricting
recently released criminals from working in nursing homes “unconstitutionally infringes on
the Employees’ right to pursue an occupation”).
130
See supra Part II.B.2.b.
131
See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961) (plurality opinion).
132
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963)
133
See Handy Dan Imp. Center, Inc. v. Adams, 633 S.W.2d 699, 703 (Ark. 1982); Fair
Cadillac-Oldsmobile Isuzu P’ship v. Bailey, 640 A.2d 101, 107-08 (Conn. 1994); Rogers v.
State, 199 A.2d 895, 897 (Del. 1964); Moore v. Thompson, 126 So.2d 543, 551 (Fla.
1961); West v. Town of Winnsboro, 211 So.2d 665, 672, (La. 1967); Terry Carpenter, Inc.
v. Wood, 129 N.W.2d 475, 481 (Neb. 1964); State v. Smith, 143 S.E.2d 293, 299 (N.C.
1965); Spartan’s Indus., Inc. v. City of Okla. City, 498 P.2d 399, 402 (Okla. 1972); Dodge
Town v. Romney, 480 P.2d 461, 462 (Utah 1971); Nation v. Giant Drug Co., 396 P.2d 431,
437 (Wyo.1964).
134
See cases listed in supra note 133.
135
See supra Part II.B.1.
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1960s is quite astonishing considering such review was all but nominally
abandoned by the United States Supreme Court. As Appendix B illustrates,
in the 1940s state courts of highest review invalidated economic regulations
sixty-eight times under economic substantive due process.136 In the 1950s
this number grewto ninety -six instances. This was in the face of the
continued, and relentless, insistence of the United States Supreme Court
that it was no longer in the business of economic substantive due process.
In the 1960s the numbers fell, but only back to the level of the 1940s, with
sixty-seven such instances according to the research underlying this
study.137 What is more, the court of highest review of every state except
Alaska, Hawai’i, and Rhode Island utilized economic substantive due
process to protect economic liberties during the period from 1940-1969.
Even these three omissions are misleading because Alaska and Hawai’i
only gained statehood in 1959, and 1960, respectively,138 and Rhode Island,
although it has refused to interpret its due process clause to provide
substantive protections,139 invalidated a state statute, on at least one
occasion, through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.140
Although no study before this one has attempted a comprehensive
review of all economic substantive due process cases during the 1940s,
1950s, and 1960s,141 prior studies have provided extensive analysis of this
period and of why the state courts hung onto economic substantive due
process for such a time.142 The excellence of those studies notwithstanding,
no study that has come to the Author’s attention has analyzed in any detail
the decades after 1970 as a distinct time period. More specifically, no study
has revealed the immense drop in state supreme courts actively using
economic substantive due process review after 1970.
And drop the numbers did. Whether the history of the 1940s, 1950s,
and 1960s be labeled “judicial activism” or “protecting the rights of the
individual,” it was not to last. During the 1970s state supreme courts
applied economic substantive due process in protecting economic liberties
on forty-eight occasions.143 Admittedly, this is not a drastic departure from
136

For what is meant by “economic substantive due process” please see supra Part II.
See infra Appendix B.
138
Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. 85-508 (1959); Hawaii Admission Act 86-3 (1959).
139
See supra note 41.
140
Haigh v. State Board of Hairdressing, 72 A.2d 674, 677-79 (R. I. 1952).
141
One study alluded to research made of how many times a state court of highest review
struck down economic regulations through economic substantive due process, but the
article did not include the specific cases from each state, and included a different timeperiod from that analyzed here. See Gary M. Anderson et al., On the Incentives of Judges
to Enforce Legislative Wealth Transfers, 32 J.L. & ECON. 215 (1989).
142
See supra note 15.
143
See infra Appendix B.
137
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past practices, but was a significant drop from the sixty-seven of the 1960s.
The bottom really fell out of the market in the 1980s, with a mere eleven
instances.144 In the 1990s the numbers fell even further, to eight. So far
during the 2000s, this research has uncovered a paltry three occasions
where state supreme courts have protected economic liberties through
applying economic substantive due process.145 In addition, unsurprisingly,
fewer and fewer states have continued the past application of the doctrine.
Since 1980 only thirteen state supreme courts have added to this study’s
case law.146
This Article now turns to a state-by-state assessment of trends in
economic substantive due process, and similar doctrines, since 1940. It
begins with those states that were active in their protection of economic
liberties through economic substantive due process in the decades following
the New Deal, and have continued to be at least somewhat active since
1980. For the sake of convenience and brevity, this Section does not
analyze each and every state that has done so, but only highlights the three
particularly interesting examples of Florida, Illinois, and Georgia. This
Article then turns to states that were active in the years immediately
following the Lochner era but who have since refused to apply the doctrine.
A.

1.

States That Were Active in Applying Economic Substantive
Due Process After 1940, and Have Continued to Since 1980

Florida! Florida! Florida!147

Heads-and-shoulders above the rest, the Florida Supreme Court has
continuously protected economic liberty through the application of
economic substantive due process. Since 1940 it has done so twenty-nine
times.148 The nearest to this is Illinois, at sixteen.149 Most of the court’s
144

See infra Appendix B.
Please remember that this does not include the use of economic substantive due process
in land use zoning cases. See supra, Part II.B.2.
146
These states are Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Montana, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. See infra,
Appendix B.
147
“Florida, Florida, Florida. I honestly believe Matt, as goes Florida, will go the nation.”
Today Show (NBC television broadcast, Nov. 6, 2000) (Tim Russert to Matt Lauer on the
eve of the 2000 presidential election).
148
See infra Appendix B.
149
See infra Appendix B. This number does not include a large number of Illinois land use
zoning cases that are excluded for reasons stated in Part I.B, supra. See, e.g., City of Loves
Park v. Woodward Governor Co., 153 N.E.2d 560, 563 (Ill. 1958) (concluding that zoning
of lot for residential purposes, adjacent to automobile plant, beyond legitimate use of the
police power); Mack v. County of Cook, 142 N.E.2d 785, 789 (Ill. 1957) (holding that
145
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economic substantive due process holdings were in the 1950s and 1960s,
but even the 1980s saw three instances, the most of any state supreme court
in the nation.150 The most recent, Chicago Title Insurance Co. v. Butler,
was a classic economic substantive due process opinion, where the court
invalidated a statute limiting the rebates that insurance agents may
receive.151 The court’s history includes many of the “usual suspects”
discussed earlier in this Article,152 including price controls,153 advertising
restrictions,154 Sunday closing laws,155 different incarnations of the state’s
Fair Trade Act,156 and occupational licensing laws.157 Furthermore, the
court has innovated to some extent, including two race track related tax
cases,158 and striking down a ban on the possession of embossing
machines.159
The reasons for the Florida Supreme Court’s extraordinary use of
economic substantive due process, including the motivations behind the
classification of property as non-commercial was not a proper use of the police power);
Hannifin Corp. v. City of Berwyn, 115 N.E.2d 315, 319 (Ill. 1953) (zoning of land in
mostly industrial area as “residential” is “manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary and
capricious”).
150
See infra Appendix B.
151
770 So.2d 1210, 1220 (Fla. 2000).
152
See supra, Part I.B.2.
153
United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Bevis, 336 So.2d 560, 563-64 (Fla. 1976) (concluding that
energy price restrictions are unconstitutional because, inter alia, they exceed the state’s
police power).
154
See, e.g. Eskind v. City of Vero Beach, 159 So.2d 209, 212-13 (Fla. 1963) (invalidating
ordinance banning outdoor advertising of lodging accommodations); Miami Springs v.
Scoville, 81 So.2d 188, 192-93 (Fla. 1955) (determining that ordinance regulating the size
of gas station signs exceeds the police power).
155
Moore v. Thompson, 126 So.2d 543, 551 (Fla. 1961) (determining that Sunday closing
law for automobile dealers exceeds police power).
156
Miles Labs., Inc. v. Eckerd, 73 So.2d 680, 682 (Fla. 1954) (invaliding nonsigner clause
of state Fair Trade Act); Liquor Store v. Cont’l Distilling Corp., 40 So.2d 371, 385 (Fla.
1949) (invalidating Fair Trade Act as “arbitrary and unreasonable”).
157
See, e.g., Snedeker v. Vernmar, Ltd., 151 So.2d 439, 442 (
Fla. 1963) (concluding
education requirement for masseurs an invalid use of the police power); Sullivan v.
DeCerb, 23 So.2d 571, 572 (Fla. 1945) (holding that photography licensing scheme beyond
the proper exercise of the police power).
158
Horsemen’s Benevolent & Protective Ass’n v. Div. of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 397 So.2d
692, 695 (Fla. 1981) (holding that permit scheme deducting one percent of race winnings
and transferring funds to private associations is an invalid exercise of the state police
power); Hilaleah Race Course, Inc. v. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass’n, 245 So. 2d 625, 62829 (Fla. 1971) (striking down as violating substantive due process statute regulating race
track operating days according to the amount of tax revenue the track produced in the
preceding year).
159
State v. Saiez, 489 So.2d 1125, 1129 (Fla.1986) (striking down statute criminalizing the
possession of embossing machines on substantive due process grounds).
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state’s individual justices, local history outside of the court’s case law, or
unusual machinations in the state’s legislature160 are beyond the scope of
this study. Although this Article briefly explores what has led to the recent
nation-wide decline in the use of economic substantive due process under
state constitutional law,161 speculations on individual states, even in the case
of mighty Florida, rely on too few data points to be of much value. What
may briefly be said is that the Florida Supreme Court has interpreted a “due
process clause” nearly identical to that of the United States Supreme Court
in striking down economic regulations.162 In short, the Florida opinions
listed in Appendix A by-and-large textually rest on nothing more than a
“generic” due process clause and the extra-textual bases of exceeding the
police power or lacking a rational basis. Nevertheless, with as much a
textual commitment to economic liberty as the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Florida Supreme Court has interpreted the Florida Constitution to protect
economic liberty through economic substantive due process more than any
other state court of highest review since 1940. Perhaps the lesson to be
taken from this is that it is not the text of the constitution that matters in
whether a court protects an economic liberty. Instead, the reasons may be
non-textual, or even non-legal, considerations.
2.

Illinois

A very distant second to Florida, the Illinois Supreme Court has
struck down economic regulations under economic substantive due process
on sixteen occasions. This has run the gamut of different areas of economic

160

All of these reasons are purely hypothetical and could be applied to any state
government. They are the type of reasons, however, that may account for a state’s steppedup enforcement of economic substantive due process. For a discussion of how the use of
economic substantive due process at the state level may be superior to that under the
United States Constitution, precisely because of local variations in state economies, see
Hetherington, supra note 15, at 250 (stating that local differences in economic realities may
countenance different results under economic substantive due process review in different
states).
161
See infra Part IV.
162
Compare Fl. Const. Art. I, § 9 (“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law . . . .”); with U.S. Const. amend. 14 § 1 (“nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law . . . .”). The
Florida Constitution does include language that directly protects economic liberties, but the
state supreme court has not been active in relying upon it. See Fla. Const. art. I § 2 (“All
natural persons . . . have inalienable rights, among which are the right to enjoy and defend
life and liberty, to pursue happiness, to be rewarded for industry, and to acquire, possess
and protect property . . . .”).
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regulation, from keeping auto records,163 to mandating that employers pay
their employees while they leave to vote.164 Occupational licensing has
taken many a hit from the court, with it striking-down four plumbing
licensing schemes alone.165 Other anti-licensing opinions include the
invalidation of the requirement that a funeral director obtain an embalmer’s
license,166 and a case from as recently as 1995 invalidating a scheme
licensing private alarm contractors.167
Illinois stands an interesting exception when viewing its supreme
court’s performance against the nation-wide trend of economic substantive
due process cases. With the exception of the roaring 1950s,168 when the
Illinois Supreme Court utilized the doctrine in non-land use zoning cases
seven times, in no decade since 1940 has the court issued more than three
opinions striking down an economic regulation on substantive due process
grounds.169 Yet, the court has issued at least one such opinion in every
decade, including the 2000s, except for the 1980s. This long, but measured,
tail stretching out from the days of the Lochner court illustrates how a court
can create a tempered, yet alive, jurisprudence of economic liberty.170

163

People v. Wright, 740 N.E.2d 755, 768-69 (Ill. 2000) (invalidating statute penalizing
auto recycling owner for not keeping accurate records even when lacking criminal intent).
164
Heimgaertner v. Benjamin Elec. Mfg. Co., 128 N.E.2d 691, 697 (Ill. 1955) (determining
a “pay-while-voting” statute “has no real or substantial relation to the object of public
welfare” and therefore is an unconstitutional use of the police power). The Kentucky Court
of Appeals struck down a similar statute. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 204
S.W.2d 973, 975 (Ky. 1947).
165
People v. Johnson, 369 N.E.2d 898, 903 (Ill. 1977) (holding that plumbing licensing
scheme, as implemented, created an unconstitutional monopoly power in the hands of
already licensed plumbers); People v. Masters, 274 N.E.2d 12, 14 (Ill. 1971) (striking down
plumbing licensing law); Schroeder v. Binks, 113 N.E.2d 169, 170-73 (Ill. 1953) (striking
down pluming licensing law as not a proper exercise of the police power); People v.
Brown, 95 N.E.2d 888, 899 (Ill. 1950) (striking down various arduous plumbing licensing
restrictions as violating substantive due process).
166
Gholson v. Engle, 138 N.E.2d 508, 512 (Ill. 1956) (striking down regulation on
substantive due process grounds, and concluding “[t]he record does not, in our opinion,
establish that public health considerations justify the requirement that a funeral director be
a licensed embalmer”).
167
Church v. State, 646 N.E.2d 572, 580, (Ill. 1995) (determining private alarm contractor
licensing scheme unconstitutional as invalid use of the police power).
168
See infra Appendix B.
169
See infra Appendix B. See Part I.B for why land use zoning cases are excluded from
consideration.
170
For an argument that the United States Supreme Court should apply a level of rationalbasis scrutiny to economic regulations, yet a stricter level of rational-basis than that
currently applied, see the comments of President Clinton’s former Acting Solicitor General
Walter Dellinger. See Walter Dellinger, The Indivisibility of Economic Rights & Personal
Liberty, 2004 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 9, 14-16 (2004).
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Georgia

This Section closes with a relatively recent opinion from the
Georgia Supreme Court. It is one of the most recent examples of a state
supreme court explicitly rejecting the federal courts’ non-use of economic
substantive due process.171 In 1987, while striking down a ban on sales
below cost, the court had the following to say about its constitutional
jurisprudence:
This court has repeatedly declared “that ‘[t]he right to contract, and
for the seller and purchaser to agree upon a price, is a property right
protected by the due-process clause of our Constitution, and unless it
is a business “affected with a public interest,” the General Assembly
is without authority to abridge that right,’” no matter what other
states or the Supreme Court of the United States “may or may not
have decided.”172
The Georgia Supreme Court’s insistence on continuing to apply the
“affected with a public interest” test is a throw-back to the pre-Nebbia
period of the Lochner era.173 In Strickland the court affirmed its earlier
determination174 that the petroleum industry is not affected with a public
interest.175 Because it was not, the legislature therefore lacked the power to
regulate its prices.176
The court’s statement that the Georgia General Assembly has no
authority to abridge the right to contract “no matter what other states or the
Supreme Court of the United States” may at first sound like a bit of
libertarian bravado, but is actually little different from statements state
courts routinely make regarding the United States Supreme Court in matters
of criminal law and privacy.177 The statement’s spirit is consonant with
Justice Brennan’s battle cry to the states discussed in the Introduction.178
171

For an older example from a different state, see the discussion of the Indiana Supreme
Court, infra notes 180-184 and accompanying text.
172
Strickland v. Ports Petroleum Co., Inc., 353 S.E.2d 17, 18 (Ga. 1987) (citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
173
See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
174
The court had earlier done so in Batton-Jackson Oil Co., Inc. v. Reeves, 340 S.E.2d 16,
18-19 (Ga. 1986) (“As it cannot be said that the gasoline industry is devoted to the citizens
of this state and its use granted to the public, we conclude that the gasoline industry is not
affected with a public interest . . . .”).
175
See Strickland, 353 S.E.2d at 18.
176
See id.
177
See supra note 2.
178
See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text.
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The court’s refusal to accept the conventional wisdom on the right to
contract illustrates that in the State of Georgia, at least as of 1987, the “New
Judicial Federalism” is alive and well in its attempt to preserve the legacy of
the Lochner era.179
B.

States That Were Active After 1940, but Have not Utilized Economic
Substantive Due Process Since 1980

As with the previous section, the following does not review ever
state supreme court that fits this category, but investigates a few examples
illustrating how a state judiciary may actively enforce the principles of
economic substantive due process review for a time, before letting the
doctrine die away. The states considered are Indiana, Massachusetts, and
South Carolina.
1.

Indiana

After four holdings enforcing economic substantive due process in
the 1940s, in 1952 the Indiana Supreme Court drew the following line in the
sand between itself and the contemporary trend of constitutional law: “This
court has in the past consistently refused to follow the ‘pattern’ or ‘drift’
apparent in the decisions of other courts which approve mere legislative
price fixing.”180 The court struck down a price restriction on automobile
dealers because they were not reasonably related to the legislative
purpose.181 In doing so it proudly cited a Lochner-era case, Liggett Co. v.
Baldridge,182 which struck down licensing restrictions on pharmacists.183 In
contrast, the United States Supreme Court subsequently overruled Liggett,
labeling it “a derelict in the stream of the law.”184

179

The Georgia Supreme Court has a long history of pining for the Lochner era. In 1951
the court complained at length regarding the plight of economic liberties in the face of
cases such as Nebbia v. New York. Harris v. Duncan, 67 S.E.2d 692, 696 (Ga. 1951).
Arguing that, in the face of a world-wide war against communism, it would not be right to
turn over to the legislature all decisions regarding economic regulation, and that “[b]y such
conduct the legislature, aided and abetted by the judiciary, could ultimately convert
Georgia into a socialist state despite the plain provisions of the Constitution which forbid
such.” Harris v. Duncan, 67 S.E.2d 692, 696 (1951). Regarding such an attitude, one
commentator mildly noted, “The Georgia Supreme Court . . . found the self restraint
philosophy distasteful.” Note, supra note 15, at 317.
180
Dep’t of Fin. Insts. v. Holt, 108 N.E.2d 629, 635 (Ind. 1952).
181
See id.
182
278 U.S. 105, 113-14 (1928).
183
See Holt, 108 N.E.2d at 635 (citing Ligett).
184
N.D. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder’s Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156, 167 (1973).
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Four years later the Indiana Supreme Court utilized the doctrine
again, striking down a restriction on automobile dealers.185 After that,
however, it left the field. Since 1956 the court has refused to invalidate an
economic regulation on economic substantive due process grounds.186 Such
a “switch in time” is not, of course, unusual,187 but it is quite a contrast to
the practice of other states that continued to fight the “drift” in
constitutional law for decades more.188
2.

Massachusetts

The now “liberal” Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts189
extended its respect for liberty into the economic sphere in the 1940s,
1950s, 1960s, and even 1970s.190 This included two cases striking down
compulsory auto insurance mandates,191 as well as occupational licensing
185

Dep’t of Ins. v. Motors Ins. Corp., 138 N.E.2d 157, 165 (Ind. 1956) (striking down bar
on automobile dealers also selling auto insurance on grounds that there was no “good
cause” for the law).
186
See infra Appendix B. The court has, however, invalidated land use zoning restrictions
on economic substantive due process since Motor Insurance Corp. See Metro. Bd. of
Zoning Appeals of Marion County v. Gateway Corp., 268 N.E.2d 736, 742 (Ind. 1971): Bd.
of Zoning Appeals of City of New Albany v. Koehler, 194 N.E.2d 49, 55 (Ind. 1963).
187
This, of course, refers to the switch in voting practices by Chief Justice Hughes between
1936 and 1937. See Micael Comiskey, Can a President Pack—Or Draft—The Supreme
Court? FDR and the Court in the Great Depression and World War II, 57 ALB. L. REV.
1043, 1046 (1994).
188
See supra III.B. The Oregon Supreme Court made a similar defiant comment to that in
Holt in 1952:
In by-gone days when government was deemed to be a responsibility of the
people, rather than the people being a responsibility of government, as is
unfortunately too much the case today, all legislation of the character now under
consideration was deemed an unreasonable interference with the right of the
individual to contract and to own and enjoy private property. Laws attempting to
fix minimum wages or prices were uniformly held invalid as being in violation of
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Christian v. La Forge, 242 P.2d 797, 805 (Or. 1952). This sentiment had little long term
effect. The court has not enforced economic substantive due process, broadly understood,
since the 1960s. See infra Appendix B. “Broadly understood” is worth emphasizing
because the Oregon Constitution lacks either a “due process clause” or a “law of the land”
clause. See Or. Const. passim.
189
See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969-970 (2003) (declaring
that denying same-sex marriage violates equal protection under the state’s constitution).
190
See infra Appendix B.
191
Traveler’s Indem. Co. v. Comm’r of Ins., 265 N.E.2d 90, 92 (Mass. 1970) (holding that
maximum rates set for compulsory auto insurance were unconstitutionally low as they were
confiscatory); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 263 N.E.2d 698, 703 (Mass.
1970) (similar holding).
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rulings.192 The original opening to the state’s constitution reflected a deep
commitment to economic liberty, proclaiming, “All men are born free and
equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among
which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and
liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that
of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness.”193 This commitment
contributed to the court’s opinion in Coffee-Rich, Inc. v. Commissioner of
Public Health in 1965.194
In Coffee-Rich the court reasoned that the consumer-protection
regulation at issue was unconstitutional because it demeaned the
intelligence of the consumer. The case concerned a law prohibiting the sale
of a dairy substitute product.195 Assessing the argument that the bar was
necessary to prevent fraud, the court bluntly, and repeatedly, stated that
members of the public must be given some credit in determining for
themselves what a product actually is:
We think that average consumers are aware that milk and cream are
not ‘vegetable product[s].’ Similarly, advertising matter displayed
on the frozen food counters from which Coffee-Rich is purveyed
clearly and conspicuously states that Coffee-Rich is a ‘frozen nondairy’ product. Again, we think that average consumers are aware
that milk and cream are dairy products. . . . We do not believe that
an average consumer would buy this product under the mistaken
impression that it is milk or cream.196
192

In re Opinion of the Justices, 151 N.E.2d 631, 632 (Mass. 1958) (stating that a proposed
regulation on the hours barbers may keep would violate economic liberties); Mansfield
Beauty Acad’y, Inc. v. Bd. of Registration of Hairdressers, 96 N.E.2d 145, 147 (Mass.
1951) (striking down bar on beauty schools accepting payment for hairdressing students
rendering services); Opinion of the Justices, 79 N.E.2d 883, 888 (Mass. 1948) (stating that
proposed bill barring cemetery owners and operators from selling cemetery monuments
would be an invalid exercise of the police power).
193
Mass. Const. Pt. 1, Art. 1 (annulled, but quoted language readopted in Article CVI).
194
204 N.E.2d 281, 289 (Mass. 1965).
195
See Coffee-Rich, 204 N.E.2d at 283. Other cases have found state supreme courts
striking down restrictions on the sale of alternative dairy products. See People ex rel.
Orcutt v. Instantwhip Denver, Inc., 490 P.2d 940, 945 ( Colo. 1971) (ruling Filled Dairy
Products Act, outlawing vegetable substitute for sour crème, to violate substantive due
process); Sun Ray Drive-In Dairy, Inc. v. Trenhaile, 486 P.2d 1021, 1024 (Idaho 1971)
(striking down statute banning “filled milk” under substantive due process); Brackman v.
Kruse, 199 P.2d 971, 978 (Mont. 1948) (declaring prohibitive oleomargarine licensing fees
unconstitutional as “excessive, confiscatory and prohibitive”); Flynn v. Horst, 51 A.2d 54,
60 (Pa. 1947) (determining act licensing the sale of oleomargarine violated substantive due
process).
196
Coffee-Rich, Inc. v. Commissioner of Public Health, 204 N.E.2d 281, 288-89 (Mass.
1965). The court also noted, “It seems to us that the defendants’ reasons for attempting to
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Because the public could be assumed to read the labels of Coffee-Rich
products, the court concluded that the consumer-protection justification for
the law was illusory. Such an inquiry, however, was not to stay in the
state’s jurisprudence for long. Eight years later the court stated that it
employed the equivalent of the federal rational-basis test in reviewing
economic regulation, asserting that “any rational basis of fact that
reasonably can be conceived” will prevent a challenge to economic
regulation.197 Since then the court has not employed economic substantive
due process to strike down a restriction on economic liberty.198
3.

South Carolina

South Carolina is an example of a state that used economic
substantive due process to protect economic liberty in the decades after the
close of the Lochner era, did not enforce the doctrine for many years, and
then whole-heartedly repudiated its use. In the 1960s the state’s supreme
court repeatedly struck-down the regulation of milk prices.199 In the
Gwynette case the court examined the various opinions in Nebbia and
explicitly adopted the reasoning from Justice McReynolds’ dissent.200
McReynolds had stated that “fixation of the price at which A, engaged in an
ordinary business, may sell, in order to enable B, a producer, to improve his
condition, has not been regarded as within legislative power.”201 He
reasoned that if the courts deferred to the legislature in its determination of
when a price regulation was necessary for the public interest, then the
prohibit the sale of Coffee-Rich are more fanciful than real.” Id. at 288 (citing Opinion of
the Justices, 79 N.E.2d 883, 888 (Mass. 1948)).
197
Corning Glass Works v. Ann & Hope, Inc., 294 N.E.2d 354, 358 (Mass. 1973); see also
Howard, supra note 15, at 882-83 (stating that Massachusetts’ highest court, and those of
some other states, “defer to legislative judgments in terms similar to those used by the
United States Supreme Court”).
198
See infra Appendix B. But see Zuckerman v. Town of Hadley, 813 N.E.2d 843, 845
(Mass. 2004) (zoning case).
199
See Richbourg’s Shoppers Fair, Inc. v. Stone, 153 S.E.2d 895, 899 (S.C. 1967) (holding
milk price-control law to be unconstitutional); Stone v. Salley, 137 S.E.2d 788, 793 (S.C.
1964) (holding milk price-control law to violate substantive due process); Gwynette v.
Myers, 115 S.E.2d 673, 680 (S.C. 1960) (declaring that a milk price-control law is an
illegitimate exercise of the police power).
200
Gwynette, 115 S.E.2d at 679 (citing Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934)
(McReynolds, J., dissenting)). About Nebbia the Gwynette court stated, “The majority
opinion in that case, however conclusive as to applicable provisions of the Federal
Constitution, does not control us in the interpretation of the Constitution of this state, under
which the issue here arises.” Id.
201
Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 554 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
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legislature could always evade judicial review of such enactments and that
“such a view, of course, would put an end to liberty under the
Constitution.”202 Relying on this, the South Carolina court struck down the
price control as an illegitimate exercise of the police power.203
Years passed by, and then in 2000 the court overruled all of these
milk price control cases. Asserting that only it and the Georgia Supreme
Court still engaged in the “affected with a public interest” inquiry, it handed
the legislature much broader powers in its ability to regulate the milk
industry.204 As seen throughout this Article, such a statement regarding
South Carolina and Georgia is misleading when taking into account the
existence of recent cases in other states utilizing economic substantive due
process.205 Furthermore, although courts might refuse to enforce some of
them, almost all of the cases listed in Appendix A have not been explicitly
overruled.206 South Carolina, in that way, stands as an exception.
IV.

WHY SUCH A PRECIPITOUS DECLINE? WAS ROE V. WADE THE FLY IN
THE CONSERVATIVE OINTMENT?

Although economic substantive due process still functions in the
state courts, it is nothing like what it was only thirty years ago.207 What
explains this drop? What explains it especially after the relatively prolific
use of the doctrine by state courts in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s?
Commentators have proposed various ideas why state courts hung onto the
doctrine in those decades immediately following the close of the Lochner
era, but because this Article is the first to recognize the more recent drop in
the use of the doctrine, no studies have so far suggested a reason for it. This
Part will introduce some possible answers. One is that state judges who
were legally trained during the Lochner era had a hard time coming to grips
202

Id. at 555 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
Se Gwynette,, 115 S.E.2d at 679.
204
R.L. Jordan Co., Inc. v. Boardman Petroleum, Inc., 527 S.E.2d 763, 765 (S.C. 2000).
205
See generally infra cases listed in Appendix A. It may have been true that, strictly
speaking, only South Carolina and Georgia used the “affected with a public interest” test,
but, as has been repeatedly mentioned, other states invalidated economic regulations
through other manifestations of economic substantive due process.
206
In addition to South Carolina, the West Virginia Supreme Court has overruled some of
its post-1940 economic substantive due process opinions. State v. Wender, 141 S.E.2d
359, 363 (W.Va. 1965) (striking down cigarette minimum price law as violating
substantive due process), overruled by Hartsock-Flsher Candy Co. v. Wheeling Wholesale
Grocery Co., 328 S.E.2d 144, 150 (W.Va. 1984); State v. Mem’l Gardens Dev. Corp., 101
S.E.2d 425, (W.Va. 1957) (deciding that regulation of pre-need sales of funeral items
violates substantive due process), overruled by Whitener v. West Va. Bd. of Embalmers &
Funeral Dirs., 288 S.E.2d 543, 545 (W.Va. 1982).
207
See infra Appendix B.
203
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with the revolution of the New Deal, and clung onto the doctrine until they
began retiring en mass in the 1970s. Another is that state justices
experimented for a time with economic substantive due process under a
“New Judicial Federalism” approach, and then, for whatever reason,
backed-off out the experiment in the 1970s and 1980s. A more
controversial hypothesis, and that advocated here, is that abhorrence by
conservatives of the result in Roe v. Wade, and of the case’s substantive due
process analysis, turned many traditional advocates of economic substantive
due process into critics of substantive due process review generally. In the
process, economic substantive due process under state constitutional law
was not eviscerated, but injured severely.
A.

The Old Judges Die Hard, and Judicial Experimentation,
Hypotheses

In 1976 Professor A.E. Dick Howard, a leading authority on state
constitutional law, had this to say concerning the continued use of economic
substantive due process in state courts:
Old habits die hard, and it is not surprising that state court
judges in the 1950’s were still thinking in substantive due process
terms. That generation of judges had completed their legal
education well before even the Supreme Court had begun to reject
the premises of the cases decided early in the twentieth century.
Once might expect, however, that by the 1970’s, with the Supreme
Court’s renunciation of substantive due process in economic cases
so clear and so widely known, state courts would have fallen in line,
and limited their own review of legislative judgments touching
social and economic questions.
A look at state court decisions since the 1960’s and 1970’s
shows that this has not happened.208
As this Article has illustrated, it did happen. Was Professor Howard merely
wrong about the data and not about the judges? As more and more law
students graduated after studying West Coast Hotel instead of Lochner v.
New York, perhaps the tipping point finally came in the 1970s, and by the
1980s and 1990s these new judges were firmly in command of the nation’s
state supreme courts, ready to avoid the ghosts of Lochner that had haunted
their chambers since the 1930s.

208

Howard, supra note 15, at 882.
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This proposal could possibly be the correct explanation. However,
it does not satisfactorily explain the rise in economic substantive due
process opinions from the 1940s to the 1950s. The rise was considerable—
from sixty-eight to ninety-six. Was this a “last gasp” of the old guard of
“Lochnarians” striking back against the forces of the New Deal?209
Perhaps. Yet, at the same time, this explanation sounds a bit too
conspiratorial for fifty sets of jurists. Perhaps instead, the judges of the
1950s collectively tried to experiment with economic substantive due
process under their own constitutions, and later assessed the experiment a
failure.210
As has been argued elsewhere—in normative evaluations of state
economic substantive due process—there are valid reasons for rejecting
such review at the federal level, but keeping it in state courts. For one
thing, state judges are often elected, so if the voters feel that a judge is
interjecting too many of her own socioeconomic views into her opinions
they can remove her.211 Furthermore, state constitutions are generally much
easier to amend than the United States Constitution.212 If the people or the
legislature disagrees with a state supreme court’s decision to protect
economic liberty through the state constitution’s due process clause, they
can amend the constitution to preclude such an interpretation.213
In
addition, state courts “may better adapt their decisions to local economic
conditions and needs” because their decisions concern only one state
economy out of fifty.214 It may be that a regulation that is unreasonable in
one market is a legitimate exercise of the police power in another.215
Another suggestion is that state legislatures, not to mention town councils,
are much more susceptible to direct and one-sided special interest lobbying
209

See, for example, the discussion of the Indiana Supreme Court’s opinion in Department
of Financial Institutions v. Holt, 108 N.E.2d 629, 637 (Ind. 1952), supra notes 180-184 and
accompanying text.
210
And often under the Fourteenth Amendment as well. See supra notes 84-94 and
accompanying text (discussing the tactic often used by state courts of highest review in
striking down an economic regulation on both state and federal grounds, thus insulating it
from review by the United States Supreme Court).
211
See Newberg, supra note 18, at 267 (stating that “in all but three states the judges of the
highest state courts are subject to various forms of majoritarian review”).
212
See id. at 267 (pointing out that many states allow for amending the constitution through
a referendum or initiative).
213
The United States Constitution, in fact, possesses several amendments that sought to
rectify a past Supreme Court interpretation. For instance, the Eleventh Amendment was a
direct response to Chisholm v. Geogria. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793); see also Tribe, supra
note 63, at 64-65 & n.10 (noting “four (or perhaps five)” occasions).
214
Hetherington, supra note 15, at 250
215
See id. (comparing hypothetical review of theater anti-scalping laws in Indiana and New
York, taking into account the different theater markets).
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than is Congress.216 State justices are perhaps better attuned to local
political forces and motivations, and can use review of new regulations to
ferret-out local protectionist legislation.
Therefore, with these and similar justifications on the minds of state
judges, perhaps the 1950s were a time for experimentation, followed by, for
whatever reason, a pull-back in the 1960s that only grew in the 1970s and
beyond.
B.

The Convergence Hypothesis

A different view is that something other than attrition, and
something specific, caused the heavy drop in cases from the 1960s to the
1970s, and especially from the 1970s to the 1980s. The 1970s, in fact, saw
less of a drop, percentage-wise, from the previous decade (forty-eight
following sixty-seven), than the 1960s did from its predecessor (sixty-seven
following ninety-six). However, the drop from the 1970s to its successor
was over four-fold (eleven following forty-eight). Such a huge drop after
the much more gradual decline of the previous two decades does not square
all that well with either the aging of old fashioned jurists or the
abandonment of an experimental “new” state approach to economic
substantive due process. It would explain the change of one court, such as
what happened to the United States Supreme Court in the 1930s, but a
waive of retirements, or a waive of experiments taking less than ten years
does not satisfactorily account for such a sudden change when those
retirements and experiments are spread across fifty different jurisdictions.
This is not to say that these trends could not have caused the four-fold drop
in cases, it is just to say that a specific event, or events, peculiar to the time
better fits the data.
If anything “big” happened to cause the four-fold drop it very likely
took place in the 1970s.217 What in the field of economic substantive due
process took place in the 1970s? Other than what has been mention up until
now in this Article, not very much. Leave off the word “economic,”
however, and something seismic occurred.
In 1973 the United States Supreme Court decided that a woman has
the constitutional right to terminate her pregnancy.218 Presaged by
216

This applies in other fields of legislation as well. See W. David Slawson, The Right to
Protection From Air Pollution, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 667, 767-78 (1986) (“Special interest
legislation is of special concern to states because state legislatures are more susceptible to
pressures from special interests that is Congress.”).
217
Of course the event, or events, could have taken place in the 1960s or before, but then
this sounds more like a long-term cause, such as the attrition of judges.
218
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
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Griswold v. Connecticut in 1965,219 Roe partly relied upon the substantive
component of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause in
recognizing a woman’s “right to privacy.”220 Although it draw largely on
the recent precedent establishing the “right to privacy,” Roe was familiar to
students of the Lochner court.221 The Court identified an unenumerated
right and then weighed that right against the state’s interest to act through
the police power in protecting public health and safety.222 The most
pertinent difference, of course, was that in this case the right was noneconomic.
As students of recent American politics know, the reaction of many
conservatives to Roe was vicious, ongoing, and relentless. Much of this
reaction pertained to the Court “making up rights” and “finding rights in the
Constitution that are not there.”223 Critics have repeatedly tied Roe to cases
of the Lochner era. Comparisons with Lochner were inevitable because
each case did essentially the same thing—protect unenumerated and (at
least arguably) Lockean rights through a substantive interpretation of the
Due Process Clause.224 Conservative jurist Robert Bork has compared both

219

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965). Griswold did not rely on the
Due Process Clause, but the opinion of Justice Douglas famously discovered a right to
privacy in the “penumbras, formed by emanations” of the Bill of Rights. Id. at 484.
220
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
221
The underpinnings of the “right to privacy” originated, to some degree, in the Lochner
era. Says Professor David Bernstein:
Roe was especially difficult to distinguish from Lochner because its foundation is
a series of Warren Court privacy decisions beginning with Griswold v.
Connecticut. Griswold, in turn, not only asserted a nontextual right of privacy,
but also relied on Lochner era civil liberties precedents. Like Lochner itself, the
Lochner era precedents relied upon in Griswold had invalidated state laws based
on an expansive, substantive interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause.
David E. Bernstein, Lochner’s Legacy’s Legacy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1, 7 (2003).
For instance, the opinion stated, “The Court’s decisions recognizing a right of privacy
also acknowledge that some state regulation in areas protected by that right is appropriate.
As noted above, a State may properly assert important interests in safeguarding health, in
maintaining medical standards, and in protecting potential life.” Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 153-54 (1973).
223
See, e.g., Michael S. Greve, A Conservative View of the Court: Getting Beyond
“Activism” and “Restraint”, NAT’L REV. (June 16, 2003) (arguing that “Brennan-era
precedents” involved “the assertion of invented constitutional rights”).
224
See supra note 221. A strong case can be made that Lochner was founded on a
traditional understanding of the “substantive” component of due process, while Roe was a
more flimsy attempt at finding a “right to privacy” in the Due Process Clause and other
provisions of the Constitution. What is important for the current thesis, however, is that
222
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of these cases to the infamous Dred Scott decision.225 Although he admits
that, in terms of economic policy, he is predisposed to agree with the result
in a case protecting economic liberties,226 he adamantly contends that it is
not the judiciary’s place to protect “rights,” such as the right to contract,
that are not explicitly provided for in the Constitution.
After contending that Dred Scott was “perhaps the first application
of substantive due process in the Supreme Court,”227 Bork states, “Lochner
employed substantive due process to strike down a state law limiting the
hours of work by bakery employees. Roe used substantive due process to
create a constitutional right to abortion. Lochner and Roe have, therefore, a
very ugly common ancestor.”228 Bork employees the tactic of repeatedly
referring to “Dred Scott, Lochner, and Roe” collectively, as though they
form an unbroken line of cases.229 Perhaps Bork himself would have
denounced Lochner era decisions whether or not Roe and its fellow privacy
cases had come to fruition. Even so, Bork’s strict constructivism is highly
attractive to a jurist who admires the free market, yet is adamantly opposed
to the liberalization of abortion laws through judicial action. In similar
abhorrence of judicial power, conservative legal scholar Graglia has
compared the methods of Roe and Lochner and argued that both are wrong
because each turns a procedural limitation on government into a substantive
one: “The due process clause . . . has absolutely nothing to do with, for
example, the power of New York State to limit the working hours of bakers
or of Texas to restrict the availability of abortion.”230
These sentiments illustrate a recognition of the similarity between
Roe and cases invoking economic substantive due process. Once Roe was
out those who vigorously disagreed with the legalization of abortion had to
find fault with the case in order to have any hope of overturning it. The
easiest way to do so was to discredit substantive due process itself. This
would assist in overturning Roe, but would also discredit the use of “due
process” clauses in protecting economic liberty.231
both protected what might be characterized as Lockean rights through unenumerated
constitutional protections.
225
ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 32 (1990) (citing Dred Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856)).
226
See id. at 225 (“I too . . . accept the correctness of laissez-faire, as so defined.”).
227
Id. at 32 (citing D. CURRIER, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST
HUNDRED YEARS 1789-1888 271 (1985)).
228
Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America 32 (1990).
229
See Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America 32, 131, 193, 209 (1990) (invoking Dred
Scott, Lochner, and Roe together for the same proposition).
230
Lino A. Graglia, “Constitutional Theory”: The Attempted Justification for the Supreme
Court’s Liberal Political Program, 65 TEX. L REV. 789, 795 (1987).
231
This is not to say Bork and Graglia changed their views in order to find fault with Roe.
It is to say that a jurist who valued economic substantive due process, yet was aghast at the
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The conservative criticism of “the right to privacy” was not the first
time substantive due process had been denounced as a form of legislating
from the bench .232 That began at least as long ago as the dawn of the
Lochner era, with Professor Thayer’s seminal article, The Origin and Scope
of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law in 1893.233 Thayer argued
for a deferential form of judicial review where a court should uphold a
statute as constitutional as long as there exists some reasonable
interpretation that would allow it to do so.234 His thesis was repeated in
various forums, from Justice Holmes’ dissent in Lochner itself,235 to the
arguments by progressive-era intellectuals that the individual’s economic
liberties must make way for the government’s power to alleviate the
suffering of capitalist society.236 As seen above,237 the United States
Supreme Court finally made way for this new progressive jurisprudence
with Nebbia and West Coast Hotel.238
Why did this distaste not reach the state courts? An easy
explanation, and a corollary to Professor Howard’s hypothesis regarding
judicial attrition,239 is that the Justices of the United States Supreme Court
in the years immediately following West Coast Hotel were progressive
scholars and politicians nominated by President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt.240 Mathematically speaking, it is easy to make a few
substitutions in a body of nine people, where a mere five will suffice, in
order to change the body’s views. However, it is much harder to change the
minds of the justices of the several state courts of highest review, supreme
in their interpretation of their own constitutions. Therefore, it is not
surprising that state justices stuck, to some degree, to the methodology of

result of Roe, might think about the former differently once faced with the existence of the
later.
232
Indeed, it was not by any means the first time that a court had been tarred with the name
“Lochner.” See, e.g. Hetherington, supra note 15, at 249 (“Frequently dissents in cases [in
state courts] holding regulations invalid on substantive due process grounds accuse the
majority of resurrecting the concepts of Lochner v. New York.”).
233
James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893).
234
Id.
235
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
236
See, e.g., Edward S. Corwin, The Supreme Court & the Fourteenth Amendment, 7 Mich.
L. Rev. 643 (1909); Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 Yale L. J. 454, 487 (1909)
237
See supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text (outlining the fall of economic
substantive due process under federal constitutional law).
238
See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
239
See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
240
Ultimately, seven of the sitting justices were Roosevelt picks. See Comiskey, supra
187, at 1046.
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the Lochner era and ignored the vicissitudes of a small body of favorites of
a Democratic president.
What is surprising, but only from today’s post-Roe perspective, is
that state justices who embraced “substantive due process” in the face of the
Supreme Court’s hostility were “conservative.” One need only look to
articles of the 1950s on the preservation of economic substantive due
process in the state courts to understand that the guardians of the doctrine
were understood to be “conservative.”241 In 1950 Professor Monrad G.
Paulsen stated that, regarding the Lochner court, “It has been charged that
the doctrine of substantive due process has been the means whereby
conservative judges have read classical economic theory into the
Constitution.”242 In 1957 an article commented on the persistence of
economic substantive due process under state constitution law by stating
that “in . . . states where more conservative social and economic theories
still hold sway, the courts have refused to follow the federal due process
doctrine and have clung to the older concept of substantive due process.”243
Yet today, “conservative” jurists often assail substantive due
process, whether of the economic or non-economic flavor, as alien to their
jurisprudence. While he sat on the bench of the Alabama Supreme Court,
Chief Justice Roy Moore was unarguably one of the most conservative
jurists in the county.244 When concurring in a parental-notification case, the
Chief Justice reflected on the doctrine’s use in Roe, rhetorically asking,
“Substantive due process? The very phrase teeters on the edge of textual
self-contradiction.”245 Chief Justice Moore did not mention Lochner and its
ilk, but with such a denunciation of “substantive due process” as a whole,
one would expect a similar rebuke of its economic subset. Furthermore,
241

Of course, just because a judge is labeled as a “conservative” does not mean that she is.
The term is, however, safe to use in this context, being that the Supreme Court that gave
President Roosevelt so many problems was repeatedly labeled a “conservative” court. See
Erwin Chemerinsky, Under the Bridges of Paris: Economic Liberties Should not be Just
for the Rich, 6 CHAP. L. REV. 31, 41 (2003) (“The Lochner era featured conservative
Justices who were deeply committed to a laissez-faire economy, protecting business from
legislative regulation.”).
242
Paulsen, supra note 15, at 92 (emphasis added) (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45, 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
243
Hoskins & David, supra note 15, at 400. It is very interesting that Hoskins and Katz
referred to states that were not only more economically conservative, but also more socially
conservative. Today, to say that socially conservative judges better respect substantive due
process than their liberal counterparts is to utter an absurdity.
244
Chief Justice Moore became nationally famous for refusing to remove a replica of the
Ten Commandments from the Alabama Supreme Court grounds in the face of a court
order. See Mauel Roig-Franzia, Alabama Court Ousts “Ten Commandments Judge”,
WASH. POST., Nov. 16, 2003, at A3.
245
Ex parte Anonymous, 803 So.2d 542, 550 (2001) (Moore, C.J., concurring).
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Justice Scalia, no friend of progressive intellectuals, has proclaimed his
contempt for substantive due process as expressed in Lochner. In a punitive
damages case where the question of substantive limitations on damages
awards arose, he opined, “I do not accept the proposition that [the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment] is the secret repository of all
sorts of . . . unenumerated, substantive rights—however fashionable that
proposition may have been (even as to economic rights of the sort involved
here) at the time of the Lochner-era cases . . . .”246
Thus, it appears many conservative jurists have come to the same
conclusion that their liberal counterparts reached decades before: economic
substantive due process cannot be trusted. This convergence, of course,
occurred for very different reasons on each side of the aisle. Liberals did
not like economic substantive due process for the obvious policy outcomes
while conservatives moved away because its use provided possible
legitimacy for the parallel method used in Roe v. Wade. When faced with
the choice of (1) distinguishing “economic substantive due process” from
substantive due process and the “right to privacy,” and (2) discrediting the
use of substantive due process altogether, enough conservative state justices
appear to have chosen the latter approach so that the number of economic
substantive due process cases has had nowhere to go but down.
This about-face in “conservative” views on substantive due process
under state constitutional law was merely part of the broader, and wellrecognized, conservative retreat from the doctrine in the wake of Roe v.
Wade discussed earlier.247 It is also a gross oversimplification of current
attitudes to judicial review amongst those often labeled “conservative.”
Legal scholars and jurists who are politically conservative often fall into
two separate categories when it comes to judicial review: judicial
conservatives on one side and a more countermajoritarian school of thought,
sometimes called “liberal originalist,”248 on the other.
Therefore,
“conservative” legal scholars may be conservative on abortion, but still
advocate heightened judicial review when it comes to economic regulation
and economic substantive due process.249 This is to say nothing of

246

TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 470 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
247
See supra notes 218-220 and accompanying text.
248
See Timothy Sandfur, Liberal Originalism: A Past for the Future, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 489, 490 (2004) (contrasting “conservative originalism” with “liberal originalism,”
and explaining that liberal originalism incorporates the Declaration of Independence, and
its underlying political philosophy, into interpreting the Constitution).
249
Professor Douglas Kmiec is one example. See Douglas W. Kmiec, 13 ST. LOUIS U.
PUB. L. REV. 183, 191-92 (1993) (distinguishing rights derived from natural law from
“new” rights, such as the right to an abortion).
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libertarian legal scholars, such as Randy Barnett, who would like to see
heightened judicial review across the board.250
The above disclaimer aside, however, nuances among legal scholars
are not what is at issue when explaining a long-term trend spread across
fifty different jurisdictions. The over-all effect of Roe v. Wade among
conservative scholars has undeniably increased distaste for “Lochnerism.”
The effect of Roe, if it did cause the drop in economic substantive due
process cases in the 1970s and 1980s, did not occur immediately. It is not
as though all of the forty-eight cases of the 1970s were issued before the
date of Roe’s publication.251 However, doctrines do not suffer such drops
overnight when spread across fifty courts with total discretion in the
interpretation of their own constitutions. However, the drop, whatever its
cause, was huge, and the accompanying conservative rejection of
heightened judicial review under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause cannot be discounted as a meme that may have spread across the
“conservative” state justices of the land.
CONCLUSION
This study has attempted to catalog every economic substantive due
process opinion under state constitutional law since 1940 in state courts of
highest review. More importantly, it has analyzed the trends that the
cataloging reveals. It has defined “economic substantive due process”
broadly to include all cases that substantively protect Lockian rights of an
economic nature, excluding cases decided under equal protection clauses,
contracts clauses, takings clauses, and cases involving land use zoning.
This is the first study that has comprehensively gathered these cases, and its
findings both confirm and discount past articles on the same subject. As
previously recognized, state supreme courts protected economic liberties
through economic substantive due process under state constitutional law
after the close of the Lochner era. State supreme courts continued use of
the doctrine through the 1940s, expanded in the 1950s, and carried on to a
great degree in the 1960s. However, what has not been recognized until this
Article is that the doctrine declined further in the 1970s and nearly
collapsed in the 1980s. Although the doctrine is definitely still alive in
some states, no state supreme court is aggressive in its use, and many states
have not employed it in protecting economic liberty for decades.
250

See Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas,
2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 21, 35-36 (2003) (praising the Supreme Court for applying a
“presumption of liberty” analysis in its opinion in Lawrence v. Texas).
251
See infra Appendix A (listing approximately as many cases from 1970-1973 as from
1974-1979).
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The reason for the rapid decline of the doctrine’s use in the 1970s
and 1980s is hard to determine without further analysis across the fifty
relevant jurisdictions. This Article has suggested a cause of the decline.
Preliminarily, the suggestion best explains the near collapse of the doctrine
in the 1980s. The suggestion is that the emergence of the “right to privacy”
cases in the 1960s and 1970s, especially the United States Supreme Court’s
protection of abortion rights in Roe v. Wade, reversed the lingering respect
of conservative state jurists for substantive due process. Within a few years
of the decision’s issuance, as is evident in the drop in the number of cases
alone, many conservative state justices joined with their liberal counterparts
in condemning the use of economic substantive due process. The doctrine,
although it had robustly persisted for over thirty years since the fall of
“Lochnerism,” fell into near disuse because there was almost no one left to
defend it.
APPENDIX A
Cases in which state courts of highest review have protected
economic liberty through applying economic substantive due process, as
that doctrine is defined in this Article, under state constitutional law since
1940
Alabama
City of Russellville v. Vulcan Materials Co.,
382 So.2d 525, 527
( Ala. 1980).
White v. Associated Indus. of Ala., Inc.,
373 So.2d 616, 620 ( Ala.
1979).
Estell v. City of Birmingham,
286 So.2d 872, 876 ( Ala. 1973).
Bulova Watch Co. v. Zale Jewelry Co.,
147 So.2d 797, 799 ( Ala.
1962).
Ala. Indep’t Serv. Stations Ass’n v. Hunter, 31 So. 2d 571, 574 (Ala. 1947).
Lisenba v. Griffin, 8 So.2d 175, 117 (Ala. 1942).
Ala. Indep’t Serv. Station Ass’n v. McDowell, 6 So.2d 502, 507 (Ala.
1942).
Alaska
None.
Arizona
Visco v. State ex rel. Pickrell, 388 P.2d 155, 165 (1963).
Killingsworth v. W. Way Motors, Inc., 347 P.2d 1098, 1101 (Ariz. 1959).
State v. A. J. Bayless Mkts., Inc., 342 P.2d 1088, 1090 (Ariz. 1959).
Findley v. Bd of Supervisors of Mohave County, 230 P.2d 526, 531 (Ariz.
1951).
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Edwards v. State Bd. of Barber Exam’rs, 231 P.2d 450, 453-54 (Ariz.
1951).
Buehman v. Bechtel, 114 P.2d 227, 232 (Ariz. 1941).
Arkansas
Ports Petroleum Co., Inc. of Ohio v. Tucker, 916 S.W.2d 749, 751
(Ark.1996).
Handy Dan Imp. Center, Inc. v. Adams, 633 S.W.2d 699, 703 (Ark. 1982).
Hand v. H & R Block, Inc., 528 S.W.2d 916, 923 (Ark. 1975).
City of Blytheville v. Thompson, 491 S.W.2d 769, 773 (Ark. 1973).
McCastlain v. R. & B. Tobacco Co., 411 S.W.2d 882, 885 (Ark. 1967).
Bachman v. State, 359 S.W.2d 815, 818 (Ark. 1962).
Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. White River Distribs., 275 S.W.2d 455,
461 (Ark. 1955).
Wilkins v. City of Harrison, 236 S.W.2d 82, 84 (Ark. 1951).
North Little Rock Transp. Co. v. City of N. Little Rock, 184 S.W.2d 52, 54
(Ark. 1944).
Noble v. Davis, 161 S.W.2d 189, 191 (Ark. 1942).
California
Hale v. Morgan, 584 P.2d 512, 521 (Cal. 1978).
Walsh v. Kirby, 105, 529 P.2d 33, 42 (Cal. 1974).
State Bd. of Dry Cleaners v. Thrift-D-Lux Cleaners, 254 P.2d 29, 36 (Cal.
1953).
Colorado
City and County of Denver v. Nielson, 572 P.2d 484, 486 (Colo. 1977).
People ex rel. Orcutt v. Instantwhip Denver, Inc., 490 P.2d 940, 945 (Colo.
1971).
City of Colo. Springs v. Grueskin, 422 P.2d 384, 387-88 (Colo. 1966).
Abdoo v. City and County of Denver, 397 P.2d 222, 223 (Colo. 1964).
Cleere v. Bullock, 361 P.2d 616, 621 (Colo. 1961).
Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. v. Francis, 301 P.2d 139, 152 (Colo. 1956).
Battaglia v. Moore, 261 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Colo. 1953).
City and County of Denver v. Thrailkill, 244 P.2d 1074, 1080 (Colo. 1952).
Connecticut
Fair Cadillac-Oldsmobile Isuzu P’ship v. Bailey, 640 A.2d 101, 107-08
(Conn. 1994).
Caldor’s, Inc. v. Bedding Barn, Inc., 417 A.2d 343, 354 (Conn. 1979).
Mott’s Super Mkts., Inc. v. Frassinelli, 172 A.2d 381, 386 (Conn. 1961).
United Interchange, Inc. v. Spellacy, 136 A.2d 801, 806 (Conn. 1957).
Amsel v. Brooks, 106 A.2d 152, 158 (Conn. 1954).
Gibson v. Board of Exam’rs of Embalmers, 26 A.2d 783, 784 (Conn. 1942).
Hart v. Bd. of Exam’rs of Embalmers, 26 A.2d 780, 782 (Conn. 1942).
State v. Miller, 12 A.2d 192, ___ (Conn. 1940).
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Delaware
Green v. Mid-Penn Nat. Mortg. Co., 268 A.2d 876, 877 (Del. 1970).
Rogers v. State, 199 A.2d 895, 897 (Del. 1964).
State v. Hobson, 83 A.2d 846, 858-59 (Del. 1951).
Florida
Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Butler, 770 So.2d 1210, 1220 (Fla. 2000).
In re Forfeiture of 1969 Piper Navajo, 592 So.2d 233, 236 (Fla. 1992).
Dep’t of Ins. v. Dade County Consumer Advocate’s Office, 492 So.2d
1032, 1035 (Fla. 1986).
State v. Saiez, 489 So.2d 1125, 1129 (Fla. 1986).
Horsemen’s Benevolent & Protective Ass’n v. Div. of Pari-Mutuel
Wagering, 397 So.2d 692, 695 (Fla. 1981).
Bass v. General Dev. Corp., 374 So.2d 479, 484-85 (Fla. 1979).
United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Bevis, 336 So.2d 560, 563-64 (Fla. 1976).
Castlewood Intern. Corp. v. Wynne, 294 So.2d 321, 324 (Fla. 1974).
Hilaleah Race Course, Inc. v. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass’n, 245 So. 2d
625, 628-29 (Fla. 1971).
Fla. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Webb's City, Inc., 219 So. 2d 681, 681-82 (Fla.
1969).
Rabin v. Conner, 174 So.2d 721, 726 (Fla. 1965).
Eskind v. City of Vero Beach, 159 So.2d 209, 212-13 (Fla. 1963).
Delmonico v. State, 155 So.2d 368, 370 (Fla. 1963).
Snedeker v. Vernmar, Ltd., 151 So.2d 439, 442 (Fla. 1963).
Stadnik v. Shell’s City, Inc., 140 So. 2d 871, 875 (Fla. 1962).
Moore v. Thompson, 126 So.2d 543, 551 (Fla. 1961).
State v. Leone, 118 So.2d 781, 783 (Fla. 1960).
Larson v. Lesser, 106 So. 2d 188, 192 (Fla. 1958).
State ex rel. Walters v. Blackburn, 104 So.2d 19, 20-21 (Fla. 1958).
Fla. Accountants Ass’n v. Dandelake, 98 So.2d 323, 328 (Fla. 1957).
Miami Springs v. Scoville, 81 So.2d 188, 192-93 (Fla. 1955).
Miles Labs., Inc. v. Eckerd, 73 So.2d 680, 682 (Fla. 1954).
Lee v. Shobe, 66 So.2d 256, 256 (Fla. 1953).
Lee v. Delmar, 66 So.2d 252, 255 (Fla. 1953).
Town of Bay Harbor Islands v. Schlapik, 57 So.2d 855, 857 (Fla. 1952).
City of Miami v. Shell’s Super Store, 50 So.2d 883, 884 (Fla. 1951).
Liquor Store v. Cont’l Distilling Corp., 40 So.2d 371, 385 (Fla. 1949).
Sullivan v. DeCerb, 23 So.2d 571, 572 (Fla. 1945).
Scarborough v. Webb’s Cut Rate Drug Co., Inc., 8 So.2d 913, 922 (Fla.
1942).
Georgia
Strickland v. Ports Petroleum Co., Inc., 353 S.E.2d 17, 18 (Ga. 1987).
Batton-Jackson Oil Co., Inc. v. Reeves, 340 S.E.2d 16, 18-19 (Ga. 1986).
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Strickland v. Rio Stores, Inc., 255 S.E.2d 714, 716 (Ga. 1979).
Georgia Franchise Practices Comm’n v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 262 S.E.2d
106, 108 (1979).
Ward v. Big Apple Super Mkts., 158 S.E.2d 396, 398 (Ga. 1967).
Williams v. Hirsch, 87S.E.2d 70 (Ga. 1955).
Cox v. Gen. Elec. Co., 85 S.E.2d 514, 519 (Ga. 1955).
Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc. v. Oneida, Ltd., 75 S.E.2d 161, 165 (Ga.
1953).
Harris v. Duncan, 67 S.E.2d 692, 694-95 (Ga. 1951).
Hawai’i
None.
Idaho
Sun Ray Drive-In Dairy, Inc. v. Trenhaile, 486 P.2d 1021, 1024 (Idaho
1971).
Winther v. Village of Weippe, 430 P.2d 689, 695 (Idaho 1967).
Berry v. Summers, 283 P.2d 1093, 1096 (Idaho 1955).
O’Connor v. City of Moscow, 202 P.2d 401, 404 (Idaho 1949).
Illinois
People v. Wright, 740 N.E.2d 755, 768-69 (Ill. 2000).
Church v. State, 646 N.E.2d 572, 580, (Ill. 1995).
People v. Hamm, 595 N.E.2d 540, 547 (Ill. 1992).
People v. Johnson, 369 N.E.2d 898, 903 (Ill. 1977).
Cook County v. Priester, 342 N.E.2d 41, 48 (Ill. 1976).
People v. Masters, 274 N.E.2d 12, 14 (Ill. 1971).
Shoot v. Ill. Liquor Control Comm’n, 198 N.E.2d 497, 500 (Ill. 1964).
City Sav. Ass’n v. Int’l Guar. & Ins. Co., 162 N.E.2d 345, 347 (Ill. 1959).
Gholson v. Engle, 138 N.E.2d 508, 512 (Ill. 1956).
Wolford v. City of Chicago, 138 N.E.2d 502, 503 (Ill. 1956).
Heimgaertner v. Benjamin Elec. Mfg. Co., 128 N.E.2d 691, 697 (Ill. 1955).
Figura v. Cummins, 122 N.E.2d 162, 166 (Ill. 1954).
Schroeder v. Binks, 113 N.E.2d 169, 170-73 (Ill. 1953).
People v. Brown, 95 N.E.2d 888, 899 (Ill. 1950).
N. Ill. Coal Corp. v. Medill, 72 N.E.2d 844, 847 (Ill. 1947).
Metro. Trust Co. v. Jones, 51 N.E.2d 256, 260 (Ill. 1943).
Indiana
Dep’t of Ins. v. Motors Ins. Corp., 138 N.E.2d 157, 165 (Ind. 1956).
Dep’t of Fin. Insts. v. Holt, 108 N.E.2d 629, 637 (Ind. 1952).
Kirtley v. State, 84 N.E.2d 712, 715 (Ind. 1949).
Dep’t of Ins. v. Schoonover, 72 N.E.2d 747, 750 (Ind. 1947).
State Bd. of Barber Exam’rs v. Cloud, 44 N.E.2d 972, 979 (Ind. 1942).
Needham v. Proffit, 41 N.E.2d 606, 607 (Ind. 1942).
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Iowa
Pierce v. Inc. Town of La Porte City, 146 N.W.2d 907, 910 (Iowa 1966).
Central States Theatre Corp. v. Sar, 66 N.W.2d 450, 454 (Iowa 1954).
Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Hoegh, 65 N.W.2d 410, 419 (Iowa 1954).
City of Osceola v. Blair, 2 N.W.2d 83, 85 (Iowa 1942).
Kansas
City of Baxter Springs v. Bryant, 598 P.2d 1051, 1061 (Kan. 1979).
Delight Wholesale Co. v. City of Prairie Village, 491 P.2d 910, 913 (Kan.
1971).
Delight Wholesale Co. v. City of Overland Park, 453 P.2d 82, 87 (Kan.
1969).
Sunflower Tip Top Dairies Co. v. City of Russell, 362 P.2d 76, 80 (Kan.
1961).
Gilbert v. Mathews, 352 P.2d 58, 69 (Kan. 1960).
State ex rel. Anderson v. Fleming Co., 339 P.2d 12, 18 (Kan. 1959).
Kentucky
Remote Services, Inc. v. FDR Corp., 764 S.W.2d 80, 83 (Ky. 1989).
Kentucky Milk Marketing and Antimonopoly Comm’n v. Kroger Co., 691
S.W.2d 893, 900-01 (Ky. 1985).
U.S. Mining & Exploration Natural Resources Co. v. City of Beattyville,
548 S.W.2d 833, 835 (Ky. 1977).
Johnson v. City of Paducah, 512 S.W.2d 514, 516 (Ky. 1974).
Adams, Inc. v. Louisville and Jefferson County Bd. of Health, 439 S.W.2d
586, 592 (Ky. 1969).
Roe v. Commonwealth, 405 S.W.2d 25, 28 (Ky. 1966).
Bruner v. City of Danville, 394 S.W.2d 939, 943-44 (Ky. 1965).
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Am. Buyers Corp., 316 S.W.2d 354, 361 (Ky. 1958).
Marshall v. City of Louisville, Ky., 244 S.W.2d 755, 757 (Ky. 1951).
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Commonwealth, 204 S.W.2d 976, 976, (Ky. 1947).
Ill. Cent. Ry. Co. v. Commonwealth, 204 S.W.2d 973, 975 (Ky. 1947).
Kenton & Campbell Burial Ass’n v. Goodpaster, 200 S.W.2d 120, 124 (Ky.
1946).
City of Jackson v. Murray-Reed-Slone & Co., 178 S.W.2d 847, 848 (Ky.
1944).
City of Mount Sterling v. Donaldson Baking Co., 155 S.W.2d 237, 239 (Ky.
1941).
City of Louisville v. Kuhn, 145 S.W.2d 851, 856 (Ky. 1940).
Louisiana
City of Shreveport v. Restivo, 491 So.2d 377, 380 (La. 1986).
City of Shreveport v. Curry, 357 So. 2d 1078, 1083 (La. 1978).
City of Crowley Firemen v. City of Crowley, 280 So. 2d 897, 902 (La.
1973).
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West v. Town of Winnsboro, 211 So.2d 665, 672, (La. 1967).
City of Lafayette v. Justus, 161 So.2d 747, 749 (La. 1964).
Sears, Roebuck and Company v. City of New Orleans, 117 So.2d 64, 66
(La. 1960).
City of Lake Charles v. Hasha, 116 So.2d 277, 280-81 (La. 1959).
Schwegmann Bros. v. La. Bd. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 43 So.2d
248, 260 (La. 1949).
Maine
State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711, 716 (Me. 1970).
United Interchange, Inc. of Mass. v. Harding, 145 A.2d 94, 97 (Me. 1958).
Opinion of the Justices, 132 A.2d 47, 49 (Me. 1957).
State v. Union Oil co., 120 A.2d 708, 713 (Me. 1956).
Wiley v. Sampson-Ripley Co., 120 A.2d 289, 291 (Me. 1956).
Maryland
Md. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Sav-A-Lot, Inc., 311 A.2d 242, 252 (Md. 1973).
Md. State Bd. of Barber Exam’rs v. Kuhn, 312 A.2d 216, 225 (Md. 1973).
Bruce v. Dir., Dep’t of Chesapeake Bay Affairs, 276 A.2d 200, 209 (Md.
1971).
City of Baltimore v. Charles Center Parking, Inc., 271 A.2d 144, 147-48
(Md. 1970).
Loughran v. Lord Baltimore Candy & Tobacco Co., 12 A.2d 201, 207 (Md.
1940).
Middleman v. Davis, 12 A.2d 208, 208 (Md. 1940).
Massachusetts
Traveler’s Indem. Co. v. Comm’r of Ins., 265 N.E.2d 90, 92 (Mass. 1970).
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Comm’r of Ins., 263 N.E.2d 698, 703 (Mass.
1970).
Coffee-Rich, Inc. v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 204 N.E.2d 281, 289 (Mass.
1965).
In re Opinion of the Justices, 151 N.E.2d 631, 632 (Mass. 1958).
Mansfield Beauty Acad., Inc. v. Bd. of Registration of Hairdressers, 96
N.E.2d 145, 147 (Mass. 1951).
Opinion of the Justices, 79 N.E.2d 883, 888 (Mass. 1948).
Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. McBride, 30 N.E.2d 269, 276 (Mass. 1940).
Michigan
Grocers Dairy Co. v. McIntyre, 138 N.W.2d 767, 771 (Mich. 1966).
Shakespeare Co. v. Lippman’s Tool Shop Sporting Goods Co., 54 N.W.2d
268, 269-70 (Mich. 1952).
Levy v. Pontiac, 49 N.W.2d 80, 82-83 (Mich. 1951).
Minnesota
Fairmont Foods Co. v. City of Duluth, 110 N.W.2d 155, 159 (Minn. 1961).

50

THE “NEW JUDICIAL FEDERALISM” BEFORE ITS
TIME

51

Mississippi
Goodin v. City of Philadelphia, 75 So.2d 279, 280 (Miss. 1954).
Stone v. Reichman-Crosby Co., 43 So.2d 184, 190-91 (Miss. 1949).
King v. City of Louisville, 42 So.2d 813, 816 (Miss. 1949).
Moore v. Grillis, 39 So.2d 505, 509, 512 (Miss. 1949).
Town of McCool v. Blaine, 11 So.2d 801, 802 (Miss. 1943).
Saucier v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co. of Tenn., 198 So. 625, 629 (Miss. 1940).
Missouri
Blue Inv. Co. v. City of Raytown, 478 S.W.2d 361 (Mo. 1972).
State on Inf. of Taylor v. Currency Servs., Inc., 218 S.W.2d 600, 604 (Mo.
1949).
Heil v. Kauffman, 189 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Mo. 1945).
State v. Taylor, 173 S.W.2d 902, 906 (Mo. 1943).
Montana
Wadsworth v. State, 911 P.2d 1165, 1174 (Mont. 1996).
State ex rel. Schultz-Lindsay Const. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 403
P.2d 635, 646 (Mont. 1965).
Garden Spot Mkt., Inc. v. Byrne, 378 P.2d 220, 231 (Mont. 1963).
Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Skaggs Drug Center, Inc., 359 P.2d 644,
654 (Mont. 1961).
State v. Canfield, 277 P.2d 534, 534 (Mont. 1954).
State v. Gleason, 277 P.2d 530,533-34 (Mont. 1954).
Brackman v. Kruse, 199 P.2d 971, 978 (Mont. 1948).
Nebraska
Gillette Dairy, Inc. v. Neb. Dairy Prods. Bd., 219 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Neb.
1974).
United States Brewers’ Ass’n, Inc. v. State, 220 N.W.2d 544, 549 (Neb.
1974).
Plucknett v. Morrison, 133 N.W.2d 18, 19 (Neb. 1965).
Skag-Way, Inc. v. Douglas, 133 N.W.2d 12, 13 (Neb. 1965).
Terry Carpenter, Inc. v. Wood, 129 N.W.2d 475, 481 (Neb. 1964).
Skag-Way Dept. Stores, Inc. v. City of Grand Island, 125 N.W.2d 529, 541
(Neb. 1964).
Lincoln Dairy Co. v. Finigan, 104 N.W.2d 227, 234-35 (Neb. 1960).
Gen. Elec. Co. v. J. L. Brandeis & Sons, 68 N.W.2d 620, 621 (Neb. 1955).
McGraw Elec. Co. v. Lewis & Smith Drug Co., 159 Neb. 703, 721-22, 68
N.W.2d 608, 618 (Neb. 1955).
City of Scottsbluff v. Winters Creek Canal Co., 53 N.W.2d 543, 550 (Neb.
1952).
Boomer v. Olsen, 10 N.W.2d 507, 511 (Neb. 1943).
Webber v. City of Scottsbluff, 3 N.W.2d 635, 638-39 (Neb. 1942).
Golden v. Bartholomew, 299 N.W. 356, 362 (Neb. 1941).
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Jewel Tea Co. v. City of Geneva, 291 N.W. 664, 670 (Neb. 1940).
Nevada
In re Martin, 504 P.2d 14, 16 (Nev. 1972).
Zale-Las Vegas, Inc. v. Bulova Watch Co., 396 P.2d 683, 693 (Nev. 1964).
State v. Redman Petroleum Corp., 360 P.2d 842, 845, 846 (Nev. 1961).
New Hampshire
State v. Moore, 13 A.2d 143, 148 (N.H. 1940).
New Jersey
State v. Boston Juvenile Shoes, 288 A.2d 7, 11 (N.J. 1972).
John Moyant, Jr. v. Borough of Paramus, 154 A.2d 9, 21 (N.J. 1959).
Gilbert v. Town of Irvington, 120 A.2d 114, 118 (N.J. 1956).
Lane Distribs. v. Tilton, 81 A.2d 786, 796 (N.J. 1951).
Lakewood Express Service v. Bd. of Public Utility Comm’rs, 61 A.2d 730,
734 (N.J. 1948).
Hart v. Teaneck Township, 50 A.2d 856, 857-58 (N.J. 1947).
N.J. Good Humor, Inc. v. Bd. of Com’rs of Borough of Bradley Beach, 11
A.2d 113, 118 (N.J. 1940).
New Mexico
Drink, Inc. v. Babcock, 421 P.2d 798, 803 (N.M. 1966).
Skaggs Drug Center v. Gen. Elec. Co., 315 P.2d 967, 974 (N.M 1957).
New York
People v. Bunis, 172 N.E.2d 273, 274 (N.Y. 1961).
Trio Distrib. Corp. v. City of Albany, 143 N.E.2d 329, 331-32 (N.Y. 1957).
Defiance Milk Products Co. v. DuMond, 132 N.E.2d 829, 831 (N.Y. 1956).
Good Humor Corp. v. City of New York, 49 N.E.2d 153, 157 (N.Y. 1943).
North Carolina
Treants Enters., Inc. v. Onslow County, 360 S.E.2d 783, 786 (N.C. 1987).
Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Ingram, 226 S.E.2d 498, 506 (N.C. 1976)
Bulva Watch Co. v. Brand Distrib., Inc., 206 S.E.2d 141, 151 (N.C. 1974).
In re Certificate of Need for Aston Park Hosp., Inc., 193 S.E.2d 729 (N.C.
1973).
State v. Smith, 143 S.E.2d 293, 299 (N.C. 1965).
State v. Byrd, 130 S.E.2d 55, 59 (N.C. 1963).
Little Pep Delmonico Rest., Inc. v. Charlotte, 113 S.E.2d 422, 423 (N.C.
1960), overruled by State v. Jones, 290 S.E.2d 675, 677 (N.C. 1982).
State ex rel. Utilities Com. V. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 113 S.E.2d 57, 61
(N.C. 1960).
State v. Brown, 108 S.E.2d 74, 78 (N.C. 1959), overruled by State v. Jones,
290 S.E.2d 675, 677 (N.C. 1982).
Winston-Salem v. S. Ry. Co., 105 S.E.2d 37, 52 (N.C. 1958).
Roller v. Allen, 96 S.E.2d 851, 859 (N.C. 1957).
State v. Balance, 229 N.C. 764, 51 S.E.2d 731, 736 (N.C. 1949).
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State
v.
Harris,
6
S.E.2d
854,
886
(N.C.
1940).
North Dakota
Fairmont Foods v. Burgum, 81 N.W.2d 639, 647 (N.D. 1957).
State v. Cromwell, 9 N.W.2d 914, 922 (N.D. 1943).
Ohio
Hausman v. City of Dayton, 653 N.E.2d 1190, 1196 (Ohio 1995).
Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Bargain Fair, Inc., 147 N.E.2d 481, 484
(Ohio 1958).
Frost Bar v. City of Shaker Heights, 141 N.E. 2d 245, 246 (Ohio 1957).
Bellevue v. Hopps, 132 N.E.2d 204, 205 (Ohio 1956).
Frecker v. Dayton, 90 N.E.2d 851, 854 (Ohio 1950).
Serrer v. Cigarette Service Co., 76 N.E.2d 91, 91 (Ohio 1947).
City of Cincinnati v. Correll, 49 N.E.2d 412, 416 (Ohio 1943).
Direct Plumbing Supply Co. v. City of Dayton, 38 N.E.2d 70, 74 (Ohio
1941).
Jones v. Bontempo, 32 N.E.2d 17, 18 (Ohio 1941).
Oklahoma
Spartan’s Indus., Inc. v. City of Okla. City, 498 P.2d 399, 402 (Okla. 1972).
Whittle v. State Bd. of Exam’rs of Psychologists, 483 P.2d 328, 329-30
(Okla. 1971).
American Home Prods. Corp. v. Homsey, 361 P.2d 297, 303 (Okla. 1961).
Okla.City v. Poor, 298 P.2d 459, 461-62 (Okla. 1956).
State ex rel. Whetsel v. Wood, 248 P.2d 612, 615 (Okla. 1952).
City of Guthrie v. Pike & Long, 206 Okla. 307, 243 P.2d 697, 701 (1952).
Englebrecht v. Day, 208 P.2d 538, 544 (Okla. 1949).
Oregon
Leathers v. City of Burns, 444 P.2d 1010, 1015, 1018 (Or. 1968).
Hertz Corp. v. Heltzel, 341 P.2d 1063, 1069 (Or. 1959).
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wahle, 296 P.2d 635, 647 (Or. 1956).
Pennsylvania
Nixon v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 839 A.2d 277, 290 (Pa. 2003).
Pa. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Pastor, 272 A.2d 487, 490, 495 (Pa. 1971).
Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 228 A.2d 169, 182 (Pa.
1967).
Lutz v. Armour, 151 A.2d 108, 111 (Pa. 1959).
Warren v. Phila., 127 A.2d 703, 706 (Pa. 1956).
Com. ex rel. Woodside v. Sun Ray Drug Co., 116 A.2d 833, 840 (Pa. 1955).
Cott Beverage Corp. v. Horst, 110 A.2d 405 (Pa. 1955).
Gambone v. Commonwealth, 101 A.2d 634, 638 (Pa. 1954).
Otto Milk Co. v. Rose, 99 A.2d 467, 472-73 (Pa. 1953).
Olan Mills, Inc. v. Sharon, 92 A.2d 222, 224 (Pa. 1952).
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Girard Trust Co. v. Pa. R.R. Co., 73 A.2d 371, 371 (Pa. 1950), aff’g Girard
Trust Co. v. Pa. R.R. Co., 71 Pa. D. & C. 533, 537 (Pa. C.P. 1950).
In re Borsch Estate, 67 A.2d 119, 123 (Pa. 1949).
Hertz Drivurself Stations v. Siggins, 58 A.2d 464, 475 (Pa. 1948).
Wilcox v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 55 A.2d 521, 528 (Pa. 1947).
Flynn
v.
Horst,
51
A.2d
54,
60
(Pa.
1947).
Commonwealth v. Zasloff, 13 A.2d 67, 72 (Pa. 1940).
Rhode Island
None.
South Carolina
Richbourg’s Shoppers Fair, Inc. v. Stone, 153 S.E.2d 895, 899 (S.C. 1967),
overruled by R.L. Jordan Co., Inc. v. Boardman Petroleum, Inc., 527 S.E.2d
763, 765 (S.C. 2000).
Stone v. Salley, 137 S.E.2d 788, 793 (S.C. 1964), overruled by R.L. Jordan
Co., Inc. v. Boardman Petroleum, Inc., 527 S.E.2d 763, 765 (S.C. 2000).
Gwynette v. Myers, 115 S.E.2d 673, 680 (S.C. 1960), overruled by R.L.
Jordan Co., Inc. v. Boardman Petroleum, Inc., 527 S.E.2d 763, 765 (S.C.
2000).
Rogers-Kent, Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 99 S.E.2d 665, 672 (S.C. 1957).
Painter v. Forest Acres, 97 S.E.2d 71, 73 (S.C. 1957).
State v. Standard Oil Co., 10 S.E.2d 778, 790 (S.C. 1940).
McCoy v. Town of York, 8 S.E.2d 905, 908 (S.C. 1940).
South Dakota
State v. Nuss, 114 N.W.2d 633, 637 (S.D. 1962).
City of Rapid City v. Schmitt, 71 N.W.2d 297, 298 (S.D. 1955).
City of Sioux Falls v. Kadinger, 50 N.W.2d 797, 800 (S.D. 1951).
Tennessee
Livesay v. Tenn. Bd. of Exam’rs in Watchmaking, 322 S.W.2d 209, 213
(Tenn. 1959).
Consumer’s Gasoline Stations v. City of Peelaski, 292 S.W.2d 735, 737
(Tenn. 1956).
State v. White, 288 S.W.2d 428, 429-30 (Tenn. 1956).
Checker Cab Co. v. City of Johnson City, 216 S.W.2d 335, 337-38 (Tenn.
1948).
Texas
Texas Power & Light Co. v. City of Garland, 431 S.W.2d 511, 521
(Tex.1968).
Ex Parte Rodgers, 371 S.W.2d 570, 571 (Tex. 1963).
Marney v. State, 330 S.W.2d 623, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 1960).
San Antonio Retail Grocers, Inc. v. Lafferty, 297 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1957).
Utah
Leetham v. McGinn, 524 P.2d 323, 325 (Utah 1974).
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Dodge Town v. Romney, 480 P.2d 461, 462 (Utah 1971).
Pride Oil Co. v. Salt Lake County, 370 P.2d 355, 356-57 (Utah 1962).
Salt Lake City v. Revene, 124 P.2d 537, 511 (Utah 1942).
Vermont
Vermont Salvage Corp. v. St. Johnsbury, 34 A.2d 188, 197 (Vt. 1943).
Virginia
Alford v. City of Newport News, 260 S.E.2d 241, 243 (Va. 1979).
Joyner v. Centre Motor Co., 66 S.E.2d 469, 474 (Va. 1951).
Moore v. Sutton, 39 S.E.2d 348, 351-52 (Va. 1946).
Washington
County of Spokane v. Valu-Mart, Inc., 419 P.2d 993, 999 (Wa. 1966).
Lenci v. Seattle, 388 P.2d 926, 935-36 (Wa. 1964).
Remington Arms Co. v. Skaggs, 345 P.2d 1085, 1090-91 (Wa. 1959).
West Virginia
Thorne v. Roush, 261 S.E.2d 72, 75 (W.Va. 1979).
State v. Wender, 141 S.E.2d 359, 363 (W.Va. 1965), overruled by
Hartsock-Flsher Candy Co. v. Wheeling Wholesale Grocery Co., 328
S.E.2d 144, 150 (W.Va. 1984).
General Elec. Co. v. Dandy Appliance Co., 103 S.E.2d 310, 313 (W.Va.
1958).
State v. Mem’l Gardens Dev. Corp., 101 S.E.2d 425, (W.Va. 1957),
overruled by Whitener v. West Va. Bd. of Embalmers & Funeral Directors,
288 S.E.2d 543, 545 (W.Va. 1982).
State ex rel. Schroath v. Condry, 83 S.E.2d 470, 477 (W.Va. 1954).
Wisconsin
Peppies Courtesy Cab Co. v. Kenosha, 475 N.W.2d 156, 159 (Wis. 1991).
Chicago & N.W. Ry. V. La Follette, 169 N.W.2d 441, 451 (Wis. 1969).
Clark Oil & Refining Corp. v. City of Tomah, 141 N.W.2d 299, 304-05
(Wis. 1966).
Wyoming
Nation v. Giant Drug Co., 396 P.2d 431, 437 (Wyo.1964).
Bulova Watch Co. v. Zale Jewelry Co. of Cheyenne, 371 P.2d 409, 420-21
(Wyo. 1962).
APPENDIX B
State-by-state, decade-by-decade summary of cases enumerated in
Appendix A.
State
Alabama
Alaska

1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s TOTAL
3
0
1
2
1
0
0
7
N/A
N/A
0
0
0
0
0
0
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Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawai’i
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New
Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North
Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South
Carolina
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1
2
0
0
3
0
3
0
N/A
1
2
4
1
0
6
1
0
2
2
0
0
5
3
1
4
0
1

4
2
1
3
2
1
9
4
N/A
1
7
2
2
1
2
1
4
0
2
2
0
1
0
2
3
0
0

1
2
0
3
1
1
8
1
0
1
1
0
1
3
3
3
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
3
5
2
0

0
2
2
2
1
1
4
2
0
1
3
0
0
2
2
2
1
4
2
0
0
0
1
0
2
1
0

0
1
0
0
0
0
3
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

6
10
3
8
8
3
29
9
0
4
16
6
4
6
15
8
5
6
7
3
1
6
4
7
14
3
1

3
0
1
2

3
1
2
3

0
1
1
4

1
0
0
3

0
0
0
1

0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

7
2
4
13

1
4
1
0
5
0
2

1
4
3
2
8
0
2

0
0
1
1
1
0
3

0
0
2
0
1
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
1
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
1
0
0

2
9
7
3
15
0
8
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South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
TOTAL

0
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
68

2
3
1
0
0
1
1
3
0
0
96

1
0
3
1
0
0
2
1
2
2
67

0
0
0
2
0
1
0
1
0
0
48

57

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
11

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
8

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3

57

3
4
4
4
1
3
3
5
3
2

